Risk analysis of Bovine viral diarrhea and Bovine herpesvirus-1 introduction based on biosecurity measures implemented in dairy cattle farms by Benavides Benavides, Bibiana
   
 
 
 
 
Risk analysis of Bovine viral diarrhea 
and Bovine herpesvirus-1 introduction 
based on biosecurity measures 
implemented in dairy cattle farms  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bibiana Benavides Benavides 
PhD Thesis 
Bellaterra (Barcelona), 2020 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
Risk analysis of Bovine viral diarrhea 
and Bovine herpesvirus-1 introduction 
based on biosecurity measures 
implemented in dairy cattle farms  
 
Bibiana Benavides Benavides 
PhD Thesis 
2020 
 
 
Directors: 
Alberto Allepuz Palau 
Jordi Casal Fàbrega 
 
PROGRAMA DE DOCTORAT EN MEDICINA I SANITAT ANIMALS 
DEPARTAMENT DE SANITAT I D’ANATOMIA ANIMALS 
FACULTAT DE VETERINÀRIA 
UNIVERSITAT AUTÒNOMA DE BARCELONA 
2020 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
Tesi doctoral presentada per Bibiana Benavides Benavides per accedir al 
grau de Doctora en Veterinària dins del programa de Doctorat en Medicina 
i Sanitat Animals de la Facultat de Veterinària de la Universitat 
Autònoma de Barcelona, sota la dirección del Dr. Alberto Allepuz Palau 
i el Dr. Jordi Casal Fàbrega 
 
 
 
 
 
Bellaterra (Barcelona), 2020. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
El Dr. Alberto Allepuz Palau, profesor del Departament de Sanitat i 
d’Anatomia Animals de la Facultat de Veterinària de la Universitat 
Autònoma de Barcelona i investigador del Centre de Recerca en Sanitat 
Animal (CReSA-IRTA), i Jordi Casal Fàbrega, profesor del Departament 
de Sanitat i d’Anatomia Animals de la Facultat de Veterinària de la 
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona i investigador del Centre de Recerca en 
Sanitat Animal (CReSA-IRTA). 
 
Certifica: 
 
Que la tesi doctoral titulada “Risk analysis of Bovine viral diarrhea 
and Bovine herpesvirus-1 introduction based on biosecurity 
measures implemented in dairy cattle farms” presentada per Bibiana 
Benavides Benavides per l’obtenció del grau de Doctora en 
Veterinària, s’ha realitzat sota la seva direcció a la Universitat 
Autònoma de Barcelona. 
 
I per tal que consti als efectes oportuns, signem la declaraciò a 
Bellaterra (Barcelona), a 15 de junio de 2020.       
        
                         
 
                                                                                                    
Dr. Alberto Allepuz Palau Dr. Jordi Casal Frabega 
Director Director 
 
 
Bibiana Benavides Benavides 
Doctoranda
 
 
 
   
Financial support 
 
The PhD studies of Bibiana Benavides Benavides were 
funded by Universidad de Nariño, Pasto, Nariño, Colombia.  
 
 
The research presented in this PhD Thesis was supported by a 
Grant from the Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación of Spain 
(AGL2016-77269-C2- 1-R). 
 
 
The publication of this dissertation was supported by the 
Departament de Sanitat i Anatomia Animals, Universitat 
Autònoma de Barcelona 
 
 
 
  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A mi mamá,  
Y a mis sobrinos: Mariana,  
Martin y Aurelia 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
   
AGRADECIMIENTOS 
Al final, solo quedan motivos para agradecer cada día vivido durante este tiempo. No 
siempre fue fácil, pero con el apoyo y confianza de cada persona que estuvo a mi lado fue 
posible.  
A mis directores de tesis, Jordi Casal Fàbrega, por darme la oportunidad de trabajar en su 
equipo, por su apoyo y equilibrio a lo largo de todo el proceso. Y a Alberto Allepuz Palau, 
por su dedicación, apoyo, paciencia y energía durante las maratones de trabajo. A los dos 
por compartir su conocimiento y experiencia.  
A Javier Diéguez y Eduardo Yus, por su ayuda con la información y actividades 
realizadas en Galicia  
A la Universidad de Nariño, por el soporte económico que hizo posible la realización de 
mi doctorado 
A todo el grupo del Departament de Sanitat Animal de la UAB, a mis compañeros y 
amigos: Sebastian, Giovanna, Yanli Li, Carla, Minerva, Ana, Andrea, Liliana, Beatriz, 
Marivi y Manoli, por la grata compañía durante estos años. 
A Jorge Hernández, por no soltar mi mano a pesar de las dificultades, sin su amor, tiempo, 
paciencia y apoyo no lo habría logrado.  
A mi mamá, mi ejemplo de perseverancia, su dedicación, confianza y amor me ha 
permitido avanzar con la seguridad de llegar a la meta final 
A mis hermanos, mis sobrinos, mis primas y mi cuñado, por estar a mi lado a pesar de la 
distancia, siempre serán mi razón de ser y mi motivo para continuar.  
A Paula y Adriana, por su amistad, compañía y cariño incondicional que me da la fuerza 
para no abandonar mis sueños. 
A mi familia catalana, Josep, María Dolors, Marta, Toni, Ana y Fermin, por el cariño, 
compañía y cuidados. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS .............................................................................................. i 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ..................................................... v 
ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................ vi 
RESUMEN ................................................................................................................ viii 
PUBLICATIONS ......................................................................................................... x 
 
1. Chapter I: Introduction ................................................................................ 1  
1.1. Routes of introduction of infectious diseases to dairy farms ................................... 3 
1.1.1. Cattle movements ............................................................................................. 3 
1.1.2. Indirect contacts ................................................................................................ 5  
1.2. Biosecurity .................................................................................................................. 6  
1.2.1. External Biosecurity ......................................................................................... 6  
1.2.1.1. Measures related with purchase of animals and animal products ................ 7  
1.2.1.2. Quarantine procedures ................................................................................. 7 
1.2.1.3. Testing animals ............................................................................................ 8 
1.2.1.4. Vehicles and equipment ............................................................................... 9 
1.2.1.5. Avoid contacts with other herds ................................................................. 10 
1.2.1.6. Control of visitors  ..................................................................................... 10 
1.2.1.7. Rodent, birds, dogs and cats control  ......................................................... 11 
1.2.2. Internal biosecurity ......................................................................................... 11 
1.2.2.1. Diseases management ................................................................................ 12 
1.2.2.2. Stocking density and work precedures ....................................................... 12 
1.2.2.3. Compatmentalization and working lines  ................................................... 13 
1.2.3. Biosecurity programs in dairy farms  ............................................................. 13  
1.2.4. Measuring biosecurity on dairy farms ............................................................ 15 
1.3. Bovine viral diarrhea virus (BVDV) ...................................................................... 16 
1.3.1. Etiology .......................................................................................................... 16 
1.3.2. Pathogenesis ................................................................................................... 16 
1.3.3. Clinical manifestations ................................................................................... 17 
 
 
1.3.4. Epidemiology ................................................................................................. 18 
1.3.4.1. Susceptible hosts and reservoirs ................................................................ 18 
1.3.4.2. Virus transmission ...................................................................................... 18 
1.3.4.3. Geographical distribution ........................................................................... 20 
1.3.4.4. Risk factors ................................................................................................ 21 
1.3.5. Diagnostic ....................................................................................................... 22 
1.3.6. Control and Eradication  ................................................................................. 22 
1.3.7. Impact over livestock industry ....................................................................... 24  
1.4. Bovine herpesvirus-1 (BoHV-1) ................................................................................ 24 
1.4.1. Etiology .......................................................................................................... 24  
1.4.2. Pathogenesis ................................................................................................... 25 
1.4.3. Clinical manifestations ................................................................................... 25 
1.4.4. Epidemiology ................................................................................................. 26 
1.4.4.1. Susceptible hosts and reservoirs ................................................................ 26 
1.4.4.2. Virus transmission ...................................................................................... 26 
1.4.4.3. Geographical distribution ........................................................................... 27 
1.4.4.4. Risk factors  ............................................................................................... 28 
1.4.5. Diagnostic ....................................................................................................... 29 
1.4.6. Control and Eradication  ................................................................................. 29 
1.4.7. Impact over livestock industry ....................................................................... 31 
1.5. References ............................................................................................................... 32 
2. Chapter II: Objectives ................................................................................. 49 
3. Chapter III: Study I ....................................................................................... 51 
3.1.  Abstract .................................................................................................................. 53 
3.2.  Introduction ........................................................................................................... 53 
3.3.  Materials and Methods ......................................................................................... 54 
3.3.1. Data .................................................................................................................. 54 
3.3.2. Risk release pathways ...................................................................................... 55 
3.3.3. Model development .......................................................................................... 56 
3.3.4. Sensitivity analysis ........................................................................................... 63 
3.3.5. Risk mitigating strategies ................................................................................. 63 
   
iii 
3.4.  Results ....................................................................................................................... 64 
3.4.1. Animal movements and biosecurity measures ................................................. 64 
3.4.2. Probability of BVDV and BoHV-1 introduction through animal movements at 
farm level .......................................................................................................... 65 
3.4.3. Probability of BVDV and BoHV-1 introduction in the 46 dairy farms analyzed
........................................................................................................................... 68 
3.4.4. Sensitivity analysis ........................................................................................... 69 
3.4.5. Risk mitigating strategies ................................................................................. 70 
3.5.  Discussion ................................................................................................................. 71 
3.6.  References ................................................................................................................ 76 
4. Chapter IV: Study II ................................................................................... 85 
4.1. Abstract ..................................................................................................................... 87 
4.2. Introduction .............................................................................................................. 87 
4.3.  Materials and Methods ........................................................................................... 89 
4.3.1. Risk release pathways ......................................................................................... 89 
4.3.2. Data ..................................................................................................................... 89 
4.3.3. Model development ............................................................................................ 91 
4.3.4. Impact of biosecurity measures in the probability of BVDV and BoHV-1 
introduction ....................................................................................................... 103 
4.3.5. Sensitivity Analysis .......................................................................................... 103 
4.4.  Results ..................................................................................................................... 104 
4.4.1. Characteristics and application of biosecurity measures in study farms .......... 104 
4.4.2. Probability of BVDV and BoHV-1 introduction through indirect contacts in the 
127 dairy farms analyzed .................................................................................. 104  
4.4.3. Impact of biosecurity measures on the probability of BVDV and BoHV-1 
introduction through indirect contacts in the 127 dairy farms analyzed ........... 105 
4.4.4. Model results and impact of biosecurity measures on probability of BVDV and 
BoHV-1 introduction a selected farm ............................................................... 106 
4.4.5. Sensitivity analysis ........................................................................................... 107 
4.5. Discussion  ............................................................................................................... 108 
4.6. Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 111 
4.7. References ............................................................................................................... 112 
 
 
5. Chapter V: General discussion ........................................................ 119 
5.1. References ............................................................................................................. 123 
6. Chapter VI: General conclusions .................................................. 130 
7. Chapter VII: Appendix  ......................................................................... 133 
Annex A – Supplemetary Information Study I ...................................................... 135 
Annex B – Supplemetary Information Study II .................................................... 140 
 
 
  
   
v 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 
  
AI 
AGID 
BoHV-1 
BVDV 
Acute infection 
Agarose gel immunodiffusion  
Bovine herpesvirus-1 
Bovine Viral Diarrhea Virus 
BVD Bovine Viral Diarrhea 
DAFF 
ELISA 
Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry 
Enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay 
EU European Union 
HACCP Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point 
IFAT Indirect immunofluorescent test 
IBR Infectious Bovine Rhinotracheitis 
LI Latent infection 
MLV Modified live virus vaccines 
MD Mucosal disease 
OIE World Organisation for Animal Health / Office International des 
Epizooties 
PI Persistently infected  
PCR Polymerase Chain Reaction 
Se Sensitivity 
Sp Specificity 
TI Transiently infected  
TR Trojan cows  
VNT Virus neutralization test 
 
  
 
 
ABSTRACT  
The general aim of this PhD thesis was to develop a risk assessment tool to support the 
decision making in relation to biosecurity measures prioritization in dairy farms. 
In the first study, a stochastic risk analysis model was developed to quantify Bovine viral 
diarrhea virus (BVDV) and Bovine herpesvirus type 1 (BoHV-1) introduction through animal 
movements. Purchasing cattle, rearing replacement heifers offsite and showing cattle at 
competitions, were considered in the model. Besides a review of the scientific literature, 
parameters were estimated using animal movement database, biosecurity surveys and the 
opinion of field veterinarians. In this model, 46 farms from Galicia and Catalonia that moved 
animals during 2017 were included. Results showed that the annual probability of BVDV and 
BoHV-1 introduction was very heterogeneous, being close to 0 in some farms and in others 
close to 1. The median of the probability of introduction of BVDV was 12% and for BoHV-
1 9%, with an inter-quartile range from 1.2% to 28% for BVDV and 3% to 23% for BoHV-
1. The highest probabilities were associated with local movements of cattle (i.e., inside the 
same autonomous community) and the fact of sharing the transport vehicle between farms. 
By evaluating the effect of biosecurity measures on a selected farm, implementation of a 
correct quarantine or not sharing transport with other farms greatly decreased this probability. 
In the second study, the probability of BVDV and BoHV-1 introduction through indirect 
contacts was quantified also with a stochastic risk analysis model. Vehicles transporting 
calves, cattle to slaughterhouse, dead animals, and food mix, as well as visits by veterinarians 
and hoof trimmers, farm workers and contacts with neighbors were considered in the model. 
For this study were included the 127 farms that participated in the project. Data to estimate 
model parameters was obtained from the sources indicated before as well as from interviews 
with hoof trimmers, animal transporters and a rendering company. Results evidenced that the 
median annual probability of introduction for BVDV was 2.1% and for BoHV-1 3.9%, with 
an inter-quartile range from 1.3% to 3.5% and de 2.6% a 6.8% for BVDV and BoHV-1, 
respectively. The calf transport vehicle and veterinarians’ visits were the routes with the 
highest risk. The biosecurity measures with the greatest impact in reducing the probability of 
introduction of both viruses were the use of boots and clothing belonging to the farm and 
avoiding the driver that transport cattle coming into contact with the animals on the farm. 
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The two models allowed establishing the riskiest pathways for each studied farm and thus 
could be useful tool to prioritize biosecurity measures that must be implemented or improved 
to reduce the probability of BVDV and BoHV-1 introduction into a farm. 
 
 
  
 
 
RESUMEN 
El objetivo general de esta tesis doctoral fue desarrollar una herramienta de evaluación de 
riesgos para apoyar la toma de decisiones con relación a la priorización de medidas de 
bioseguridad en granjas lecheras. 
En el primer estudio, se desarrolló un modelo de análisis de riesgo estocástico para cuantificar 
la probabilidad de introducción del Virus de la Diarrea Vírica Bovina (BVDV) y del 
Herpesvirus Bovino tipo 1 (BoHV-1) a través del movimiento de animales, es decir, compra 
o introducción de animales, recría criada fuera de la granja y movimientos a ferias de ganado. 
Los parámetros se obtuvieron a partir de literatura científica, así como de la base de datos de 
movimientos animales de la Administración, encuestas de bioseguridad y opinión de los 
veterinarios de campo. En el análisis se incluyeron 46 granjas de Galicia y Catalunya que 
movieron animales durante el 2017. La probabilidad anual de introducción de BVDV y 
BoHV-1 fue muy heterogénea, siendo cercana a 0 en algunas granjas y en otras cercano a 1. 
La mediana de la probabilidad anual de introducción de BDVD fue 12% y para BoHV-1 9%, 
con un rango intercuartílico entre 1.2% y 28% para BVDV y 3% a 23% para BoHV-1. Las 
probabilidades más altas estaban asociadas al movimiento local de animales (i.e., dentro de 
la misma comunidad autónoma) y al hecho de compartir el vehículo de transporte entre 
granjas. Al evaluar el efecto de las medidas de bioseguridad en una granja, la implementación 
de una correcta cuarentena y el no compartir el transporte con otras granjas disminuyo 
considerablemente esta probabilidad.  
En el segundo estudio, se cuantificó la probabilidad de introducción de BVDV y BoHV-1 a 
través de contactos indirectos, para lo cual también se desarrolló un modelo de análisis de 
riesgo estocástico. Se consideraron los vehículos que transportan terneros, animales a 
matadero, cadáveres y mezcla de alimentación, así como los visitantes, entre los que se 
incluyeron veterinarios, podólogos, trabajadores de las granjas y vecinos. Para este estudio se 
evaluaron las 127 granjas que participaron en el estudio y la información para la estimación 
de los parámetros del modelo, además de las fuentes citadas anteriormente, se obtuvo de 
entrevistas a podólogos, transportadores de animales y una empresa de recolección de 
cadáveres. Los resultados mostraron que la mediana de la probabilidad anual de introducción 
para BVDV fue de 2.1% y para BoHV-1 del 3.9%, en un rango intercuartílico de 1.3% a 3.5% 
y de 2.6% a 6.8% para BVDV y BoHV-1, respectivamente. La entrada del vehículo de 
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transporte de terneros y las visitas de los veterinarios fueron las vías de entrada con mayor 
riesgo. Las medidas de bioseguridad con un mayor impacto en la disminución de la 
probabilidad de introducción de los dos virus fueron el uso de botas y ropa propios de la granja 
y evitar que el conductor que transporta animales entre en contacto con los animales de la 
granja. 
Los dos modelos permitieron establecer las vías de entrada más riesgosas para cada granja 
estudiada y de esta forma pueden ser una herramienta útil para priorizar las medidas de 
bioseguridad que deben implementarse o mejorarse para reducir la probabilidad del ingreso 
de BVDV y BoHV-1en una granja. 
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1.1. Routes of infectious diseases introduction to dairy 
farms 
International trade, globalization, and global warming increases the probability of disease 
spread among countries and therefore enhance the importance of preventive measures 
against infectious diseases (Barkema et al., 2009). The prevention and control of infectious 
diseases relies on monitoring the health status of the herd, increasing host resistance to 
infection, removing reservoirs of infection and preventing contacts that result in 
transmission (i.e., biosecurity measures) (Smith and Grotelueschen, 2004). 
On dairy farms, infectious diseases can cause important economic losses to producers. 
These can be due to direct costs such as treatment and production losses or indirect costs 
such as potential loss of market access for hazards with animal or public health risks (Wells, 
2000; Van Schaik et al., 2002; Maunsell and Donovan, 2008).  
Infectious diseases can enter a dairy herd through different routes. The most important route 
is through introduction of new animals, especially replacement heifers, or other type of 
contact between live animals (e.g., at pastures, markets, etc.) (Brennan et al., 2008; 
Nöremark et al., 2013). Transmission through people and vehicles visiting the herd, other 
animals beside cattle (e.g., cats, dogs, rodents), fomites (e.g., feeding utensils, farm 
equipment, veterinary material), vectors (either biological or mechanical) and contaminated 
water or feed, could be also important (Wells, 2000; Villarroel et al., 2007). 
1.1.1. Cattle movements  
Dairy farms around the world are undergoing a significant increase in their size and 
consequently important changes in their structure. In Europe, social, land space, and 
legislative and economic pressures constrain the growth of dairy herds in many parts of 
Western Europe (LeBlanc et al., 2006). However, the elimination of the European Union 
(EU) production quotas opened a new era of unrestricted milk production (Sayers et al., 
2013). A collateral effect of the herd expansion in dairy farms is an increase in the cattle 
movements. On the one hand, young animals might be sent to external facilities to be raised 
and then they return before (or eventually after) the first calving. On the other hand, some 
farms might buy all the replacement heifers from other farms.  
The introduction of cattle from external sources rather than internal herd growth implies the 
risk of introduction of pathogens (Maunsell and Donovan, 2008; Barkema et al., 2015). The 
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most important source is through purchase of infected animals because not many of these 
animals are screened for infectious diseases before or shortly after arrival at the dairy farm 
(Faust et al., 2001; Hoe and Ruegg, 2006). In addition, in case of multiple-source purchase, 
herds-of-origin health histories are usually unknown (Maunsell and Donovan, 2008). This 
trend of herd expansion leads to an increased risk of disease transmission, due to 
commingling of animals from various sources or factors such as transport increasing stress 
levels potentially exacerbating latent disease conditions (Brennan et al., 2008). 
Cattle movements due to reintroduction of cattle returning from out-farms (e.g. replacement 
heifers, common pastures) or that participated in cattle shows, or shared transportation with 
cattle from other farms, can play a significant role in the introduction of diseases (Van 
Schaik et al., 2002; Robinson and Christley, 2007; Mee et al., 2012; Gates et al., 2013). 
Furthermore, most farmers take insufficient measures to prevent spread of infections from 
animals reintroduced or returning from a calf-rearing facility or after a cattle 
fair/competition or market (Van Schaik et al., 2002; Villarroel et al., 2007).  
Managing health risks when introducing animals to dairy herds should include control 
strategies before purchase and post-purchase management of animals (Maunsell and 
Donovan, 2008). Purchasing stock from certified disease-free source herds or high health 
status markets can greatly reduce the risk of introducing diseases (Wells, 2000; Sibley, 
2010). Quarantine and testing before introduction are the most important biosecurity 
measures post-purchase. However, quarantine is very difficult on most dairy farms or 
ineffective implemented (e.g., the quarantine pens are adjacent to the existing herd or only 
is quarantined a portion of incoming cattle) (Faust et al., 2001; Villarroel et al., 2007).  
Measures to reduce the probability of infection during transportation for animal movements 
include i) cleaning and disinfection of transport vehicles (Schnyder et al., 2019); ii) loading 
and unloading animals at the perimeter of the farms; iii) not mixing animals from different 
sources in the transport vehicle) (Maunsell and Donovan, 2008; Mee et al., 2012), and iv) 
minimizing transport distances and other stressors such as overcrowding (Greger, 2007). 
Legislation to control movement may also reduce the spread of infectious agents and is a 
frequent state-mediated reaction to exotic disease outbreaks (Valle et al., 1999; Van Schaik 
et al., 2002; Mee et al., 2012).  
The best alternative, from a biosecurity point of view, would be maintaining a closed herd 
(i.e., without the purchase of new animals) because it eliminates infection risk from 
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purchased cattle (Wells et al., 2002; Nöremark et al., 2013; Mee et al., 2012). However, 
even specific pathogen-free and closed herds experience disease breakdowns, reflecting the 
important role of other transmission routes (Van Schaik et al., 2002). 
1.1.2. Indirect contacts 
The role of indirect transmission of livestock diseases is still largely unknown. First, due to 
the highly diverse and complex nature of indirect contacts, it is difficult to assess the relative 
importance of these transmission pathways. On the other hand, because of privacy reasons, 
it is much easier to track cattle movements than that of farm operators and personnel for 
example (Rossi et al., 2017b). The probability of transmission given an indirect contact is 
considered to be much lower that direct animal–animal contacts. However, the likelihood 
of transmission is a combination of the probability of transmission given a contact and the 
frequency of such contacts and in the case of indirect contacts, they can occur at a relative 
high frequency (Ribbens et al., 2009). 
Visitors to farms can introduce an infectious agent via their hands, but also their clothing, 
boots, equipment, and vehicles (Morley, 2002; Kirk et al., 2003). High-risk visitors include 
those people that usually have contact with dairy cattle such as veterinary practitioners, hoof 
trimmers, artificial insemination technicians, farm workers, other farmers and drivers of 
vehicles such as rendering or livestock vehicles (Sibley, 2010; Mee et al., 2012). Neighbors 
have a particular importance in densely populated areas and during the pasture season (Qi 
et al., 2019). In addition, farms that are contiguous are probably more likely to establish 
social relationships, facilitating sharing of equipment and potentially transmission of 
infectious agents via vehicles and personnel (Brennan et al., 2008). However, although 
visitors are known to be potential disease spreaders, there are very limited published studies 
that address this issue (Van Schaik et al., 2001; Rossi et al., 2017a).  
Contaminated farm machinery, vehicles, veterinary equipment, (e.g. needles and syringes, 
nose tongs, halters, obstetrical equipment, dosing equipment, dehorning equipment, hoof 
paring equipment), and general farm equipment can all act as fomites for introduction of 
infectious agents into herds (Gunn, 1993; Lang-Ree et al., 1994; Niskanen and Lindberg, 
2003; Mee et al., 2012). Various cattle pathogens, such as Bovine Viral Diarrhea Virus 
(BVDV) can survive in these fomites and therefore be implicated in the transmission chain 
(Stevens et al., 2011).  
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There are highly significant infectious diseases of cattle (e.g., respiratory diseases or foot 
and mouth disease) that can be carried and transmitted over long distances or between 
compartments of the farm by other animals either domestic ones (e.g., dogs and cats) or 
wildlife species (Sibley, 2010; Dewulf and Van Immerseel, 2018). Pathogens can be also 
transmitted by vectors (mosquitos, flies, ticks, etc.) either biologically (the pathogen 
replicates within the vector) or mechanically (without replication within the vector) where 
the transmission is influenced by several factor such as density of vectors (dependent on 
environmental conditions), and density of susceptible hosts (Dewulf and Van Immerseel, 
2018). 
Finally, water sources shared between farms could be an efficient way of spreading several 
pathogens amongst animals that drink the contaminated water (Sibley, 2010; Dewulf and 
Van Immerseel, 2018). Also, feed can be contaminated by spreading manure on fields 
where crops are grown or irrigating fields with contaminated water or crops that have been 
fertilized with manure from other dairies (Villarroel et al., 2007). 
 
1.2. Biosecurity  
Biosecurity consists of a set of management and physical measures designed to reduce the 
risk of introduction, establishment and spread of animal diseases, infections, or infestations 
to, from and within an animal population (OIE, 2019). The goal of biosecurity measures is 
to prevent different transmission routes to break the spread chain (Wells, 2000; Villarroel 
et al., 2007). Biosecurity can be divided in two main components: external biosecurity or 
bioexclusion that prevent pathogens from entering a herd, and internal biosecurity or 
biocontainment which reduce the spread of pathogens within a herd (Villarroel et al., 2007; 
Laanen et al., 2013). 
1.2.1. External biosecurity (Bioexclusion) 
External biosecurity includes all practices devoted to preventing (risk reduction strategies) 
the farm's contact with the outside world avoiding the introduction of pathogens (hazards) 
(Mee et al., 2012). The main components of external biosecurity include measures related 
to: purchase of animals and animal products, transport of animals, other vehicles and 
equipment, removal of manure and cadavers, supply of fodder, water and equipment, access 
of personal and visitors, rodents and bird control, and location and environment (Dewulf 
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and Van Immerseel, 2018). The principal actions are isolation, and diagnostic testing of 
new animals or animals returning to the farm, quarantine procedures, vehicle access control, 
avoid contacts with other herds and grazing areas, and control of visitor access (Kristensen 
and Jakobsen, 2011; Moore et al., 2008; Villarroel et al., 2007). 
1.2.1.1. Measures related with purchase of animals and animal products 
The general advice is to avoid purchasing cattle as much as possible (Sarrazin et al., 2018). 
However, if cattle are purchased, they should come from farms with a sanitary status that is 
equal to or higher that the own farm (Wells, 2000). If the previous options are not possible, 
another option is purchasing animals from herds of known disease status so that any risks 
can be managed and mitigated appropriately (Sibley, 2010). Other practices include 
reducing the number of animals and the number of herds from which the animals are 
purchased (Mee et al., 2012), avoiding purchases from markets or dealers (Kristensen and 
Jakobsen, 2011). To prevent BVDV, not buying pregnant animals reduces the risk of 
transmission of infection from an infected fetus (Lindberg and Houe, 2005). For animal 
products like sperm, embryos, or colostrum the health status of farms/institutions of origin 
must be considered (Sarrazin et al., 2018). 
1.2.1.2. Quarantine procedures  
Quarantine is the isolation of cattle in an area that prevents direct or indirect contact with 
other livestock. All incoming cattle can be grouped together in one or more receiving pens 
(even when originating from different sources) and be separated from the general 
population (Villarroel et al., 2007; Raaperi et al., 2014). The quarantine period should be 
long enough to allow detection of clinical signs. It has generally been recommended to be 
three or four weeks but will depend on the diseases of concern (Wells et al., 2002; Maunsell 
and Donovan, 2008). If animals have been tested, the quarantine should last until 
confirmation of the negative status of the animals is available.  
Cattle in lactation should preferably be milked inside the quarantine area, and for pregnant 
cattle, calving should occur in the quarantine area and the new born should be tested 
immediately after birth (before the intake colostrum) and should be quarantined until test 
result are available. Finally, the all-in/all-out principle should be applied in the quarantine 
area (Sarrazin et al., 2018). 
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An appropriate quarantine area should be separate from the resident herd as much as 
possible. Housing should be clean and comfortable with good ventilation, and water 
sources. The facility should be designed so that routine health monitoring is easily done, a 
safe transition ration can be fed, and group health management procedures can be performed 
easily (Maunsell and Donovan, 2008). If the farm do not have such facilities, an alternative 
would be to house cattle in a separate group in the most remote location on the farm (i.e., 
pasture or an old building) (Villarroel et al., 2007; Dewulf and Van Immerseel, 2018). 
Indirect disease transmission from cattle in quarantine is possible through people that enter 
the quarantine area, material that is used and through water and feed that are provided to 
the cattle (Sarrazin et al., 2018). Therefore, quarantine should be attended by specifically 
designated personnel. An alternative would be to assign trained personnel with strict 
hygiene and disinfection protocols and avoid these personnel to have immediate access to 
neonatal calves or maternity areas after working in the quarantine. In addition, is 
recommended to enter the quarantine area at the end of daily work routine (Villarroel et al., 
2007; Dewulf and Van Immerseel, 2018). Specific clothing and boots should be available 
at the entrance of this area and everyone who entered the quarantine should make use of it. 
Specific material also should be available in the quarantine area and not be used in the other 
areas of farm (Edwards, 2010). 
1.2.1.3. Testing animals 
Testing animals on arrival is commonly recommended for many infectious diseases and can 
greatly enhance the sensitivity of detecting an infectious animal and therefore reduce risk 
(Wells, 2000; Maunsell and Donovan, 2008; Moore et al., 2008). The consequences of a 
false negative far outweigh those of a false positive; sensitivity should be favored over 
specificity for screening tests (Barkema et al., 2009).  
Testing could be in a pool of samples of all cattle, a representative subset of cattle, or from 
all individual cows. Regardless the sampling strategy, the most important is do not allow 
any animal to be released into the general population until all submitted biological samples 
are found to have negative results (Wells, 2000; Villarroel et al., 2007). In addition, testing 
specific group of animals such as the progeny of females purchased while pregnant can 
enable the detection of infectious agents transmitted transplacentally, e.g., BVDV or 
Neospora (Sibley, 2010). 
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1.2.1.4 Vehicles and equipment  
Transport of animals: Vehicles entering the farm also should be considered, especially those 
ones that pick up culled animals, cattle to slaughter or calves as they usually visit different 
farms to complete the capacity of the truck (Dewulf and Van Immerseel, 2018). Contact 
with animals with unknown diseases status from other farms added to the stressful situation 
increase the risk of becoming infected during transport (Mee et al., 2012). Smith et al. 
(2013) observed that when animals from different farms are transported separately but in 
successive shipments, the risk of transmission of infectious agents potentially increases. 
Therefore, ideally, only cattle designated for the farm should be present in the vehicle, 
otherwise animal transport vehicles should arrive empty, clean and disinfected before 
entering. When the farm uses their own transport vehicle, it is easier to control the cleaning 
and disinfection status of the vehicle (Sarrazin et al., 2018).  
Appropriate cleaning and the application of a disinfection protocol for vehicles, as well as 
biosecurity measures at the farm, may be crucial for limiting the spread of disease via shared 
vehicles (Dee et al., 2004). Other measures at the farm level, such as move cattle leaving 
the farm to a separate building or loading area outside should prevent contact with the herd. 
The transporter should not be allowed to enter the stables in order to avoid contact with the 
animals of the farm (Sarrazin et al., 2018). 
Other vehicles entering the farms include milking trucks, feed trucks, rendering trucks and 
visitor vehicles. The probability of transmission of pathogens will depend on the type of 
vehicle. The rendering company trucks are considered of higher risk than other type of 
vehicles (e.g., feed trucks) (Ribbens et al., 2009). Although feed and milk collection trucks 
are rarely exposed to the animals on farms (Nöremark et al., 2013), these vehicles could 
suppose a risk as they visit several farms in the same day (Ribbens et al., 2009). Feed should 
be delivered, and tank milk collected without the driver having to enter the stables (Sarrazin 
et al., 2018). 
Biosecurity measures to avoid introduction of pathogens on vehicles include restricting 
access to areas of the farm where animals are housed. The receiving area at the farm should 
be located as far away from animals as possible and clearly identified at the entrance of the 
farm (Villarroel et al., 2007). On the other hand, all inbound and outbound traffic that serves 
multiple companies should be split up into a clean and a dirty section. The clean road for 
intra-farm movements and dirty road to manure transport (Dewulf and Van Immerseel, 
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2018). Cadavers should always be handled with specific attention (e.g., use gloves when 
manipulated) and stored in a separate place from the animals. After pick-up, the storage 
place should be cleaned and disinfected. This storage space should be located out of the 
farm to avoid vehicles of the rendering company having to enter the farm (Sarrazin et al., 
2018). 
Shared equipment between farms include tractors, trailers, and wagons, followed by 
machinery for harvesting and ploughing, and manure vehicles. Therefore, ensuring that the 
equipment is cleaned and disinfected when returned to the farm may be important in 
limiting this route of transmission (Brennan et al., 2008).  
1.2.1.5. Avoid contacts with other herds 
It should be avoided the contact between animals from different farms. These practices 
include pastures shared in the same season, or through an adjacent pasture, and farms with 
access to the same surface water in pastures. In those instances, double fences can reduce 
the risk of diseases transmission (Van Schaik et al., 2001; Dewulf and Van Immerseel, 
2018). For animals that participate in fairs, markets or competitions, the unsold cattle and 
rearing replacement heifers offsite, should be quarantined when they return to the farm 
according to the same principles mentioned above (Van Schaik et al., 2002; Sarrazin et al., 
2018). 
1.2.1.6. Control of visitors 
Visitors include professionals (i.e., veterinarians, artificial insemination technicians, cattle 
salesmen, feed suppliers, milk collectors, rendering companies, hoof trimmers) and non-
professional (i.e., friends, family and neighbors). However, the veterinarian is the 
professional visitor that enters animal compartments most frequently and usually they can 
enter freely at the farm and stables where cattle are housed (Nöremark et al., 2013; Sarrazin 
et al., 2014; Sarrazin et al., 2018). Also, farm workers who have contact with animals on 
other farms or have animals in their house can also introduce diseases by acting as visitors 
(Villarroel et al., 2007). In addition, social visits that have contact with areas where animals 
are located, might also represent a risk for disease spread (Nielen et al., 1996). 
Cattle farms receive several visitors that have close contact with animals. Therefore, 
variation in frequencies contact may affect the farm-level risk of pathogen transmission 
(Brennan et al., 2008). The main recommendation is fencing the farm and closing the 
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entrance with a gate, making the phone number of the farmer visible so visitors can only 
enter the farm after notifying the farmer (Sarrazin et al., 2018).  
General biosecurity measures for visitors, include maintaining an area separated from 
livestock and farm activities restricted for external visitors (Maunsell and Donovan, 2008; 
Sibley, 2010; Mee et al., 2012). The farm should provide personal protective equipment, 
e.g., gloves, footwear or clean boots and overalls that cannot be taken from the farm, and 
handwashing and boot washing facilities for maintaining proper hygiene (Morley, 2002; 
Van Schaik et al., 2002; Sibley, 2010). Therefore, a sanitary transition zone where visitors 
can change clothes and wash their hands should be located (Sarrazin et al., 2018). In 
addition, education and guidance for workers over standard operating procedures should be 
written and visible at the entrance of the facilities (i.e., basic hygiene procedures and in the 
areas of disease awareness, prevention, and control) (Villarroel et al., 2007). 
1.2.1.7. Rodents, birds, dogs and cats control  
An efficient rodent control should not allow them to breed in the barn surroundings, which 
includes removing hiding places near to the barns, also traps and poison are recommended 
for controlling rodents (Dewulf and Van Immerseel, 2018, Sarrazin et al., 2018). To avoid 
diseases transmission through domestic animals, access to the barns should not be possible 
and manure storage facility, and feed should be stored in well closed rooms (Sibley, 2010). 
On the other hand, bird droppings, urine and feces of wildlife could contaminate surface 
water, for this reason is necessary filtration and chemical sterilization of drinking water. In 
addition, periodic monitoring of water quality with analysis for chemicals, minerals, and 
bacteria should be carried out (Villarroel et al., 2007). 
1.2.2. Internal biosecurity (Biocontainment) 
Internal biosecurity can be defined as the measures taken to limit within-farm transmission 
of diseases between groups of animals, it is related to farm management and daily practice 
(Mee et al., 2012; Dewulf and Van Immerseel, 2018). Biocontainment also serves as an 
important backup system for biosecurity plans. When biosecurity is breached, 
biocontainment measures can prevent the spread of disease agents on a farm (Villarroel et 
al., 2007). The main components of internal biosecurity include: disease management, 
stocking density, work procedures, staff education, compartmentalization and working 
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lines, cleaning and disinfection of barns, equipment and tools (Moore et al., 2008; 
Kristensen and Jakobsen, 2011; Dewulf and Van Immerseel, 2018). 
1.2.2.1. Diseases management 
It is recommendable to have a register with animal health data that includes different data 
such as animals sick, animals under treatment and which treatment they are receiving, or 
vaccination protocols, among others (Edwards, 2010, Sarrazin et al., 2018). 
The strategy consists correct handling and treatment of diseased animals, including proper 
diagnostics, isolation, and diseases registration. Treatments of animals should be performed 
carefully to avoid iatrogenic transmission or contamination of material by environmental 
pathogens (Dewulf and Van Immerseel, 2018). Disease management will require resources 
and enthusiasm that can only be achieved by agreement between all workers involved in 
farm management (Sibley, 2010). 
The farm should have hospital pens where sick animals are housed to prevent direct and 
indirect transmission of diseases to other animals. Its use should be exclusive to sick animals 
and should be cleaned and disinfected each time after its use (Maunsell and Donovan, 
2009). When a lactating cow is diseased it should be milked in the hospital pen, otherwise 
as the last one in the regular milking in order to avoid contact with healthy animals (Hage 
et al., 2003). 
1.2.2.2. Stocking density and work procedures 
The number of animals should be according to the capacity of the pen to avoid stress caused 
by overpopulation that increases susceptibility to infections and rises the excretion of 
pathogens (Dewulf and Van Immerseel, 2018). 
It is important to make work routines as easy as possible for employees, providing stations 
for hand and boot washing. These stations should be convenient located next to the work 
site. Brushes need to be in good working order and hoses there must be enough water 
pressure to wash effectively. Proper use of footbaths is necessary if they are to be effective. 
Boots should be rinsed off before using the footbath because inorganic material inactivates 
disinfectants and footbaths need to be inspected and changed at least daily and as often as 
necessary, to keep them clean (Dargatz et al., 2002). 
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1.2.2.3. Compartmentalization and working lines 
The facilities design of a cattle farm can help prevent spread of pathogens, separating 
animals according to age groups in different areas. Workers should follow a work routine 
starting in the youngest animals’ facilities, continuing with the adults and finally the 
quarantine and sick pens. (Dewulf and Van Immerseel, 2018). Susceptible animals in farm 
(i.e., periparturient cows, and newborns) should be located as far away from any hospital 
pens, and the flow of cattle movement within farm should be unidirectional (Villarroel et 
al., 2007). It is recommendable to use age-specific material for each age group and feeding 
utensils should only be used for feed. Equipment must be routinely cleaned and disinfected, 
and hygiene practices related with changing clothing, footwear and washing hands should 
be applied systematically (Villarroel et al., 2007, Dewulf and Van Immerseel, 2018). 
1.2.3. Biosecurity programs in dairy farms  
Biosecurity programs can be implemented at different levels such as country, region, or 
herd. At national level, minimizing the probability of introduction of exotic diseases and 
maintaining contingency plans are essential policies (Barkema et al., 2009). Animal 
identification, livestock tracing schemes, and advanced disease recording systems are 
important components for these policies as they allow tracing the spread of infections on a 
regional or national level, which is of paramount importance in the case of an outbreak of 
an exotic disease (LeBlanc et al., 2006). At the farm level, reducing the likelihood of disease 
introduction through adequate biosecurity practices would improve the animal health and 
welfare status of the herd, which in turn would improve pro-fits and job satisfaction 
(Barkema et al., 2009; Brennan and Christley, 2012). The implementation of biosecurity 
practices is an effective way to prevent and control many infectious diseases on farms 
(Ritter et al., 2017).  
General biosecurity programs and protocols should be defined and applied on all dairy 
farms to prevent the introduction of diseases, they should include measures directed at 
reducing risk due to the most important transmission routes, at the same time, it can be 
applied other measures against specific pathogens. The general principles of biosecurity 
strategies include: i) separation of high and low risk animals and environments; ii) reduction 
of the general infection pressure and, iii) prioritize biosecurity measures against higher risk 
transmission routes (Wells, 2000; Dewulf and Van Immerseel, 2018). In this sense, standard 
framework, similar to the Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) programs 
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that are widely applied in food safety, could be adopted when designing a biosecurity 
program in dairy farms (Villarroel et al., 2007). These programs should be developed in 
collaboration with the herd veterinarian who knows the specific herd structure and the 
farmer (Villarroel et al., 2007; Brennan and Christley, 2012). Biosecurity programs should 
be monitored and regularly reevaluated and updated. Producers should be able to assess the 
effect of the implementation of the different biosecurity measures on the reduction of the 
risk of infection, health and the productive indices of farm (Raizman et al., 2006; Oidtmann 
et al., 2011; Van Steenwinkel et al., 2011). 
The implementation of biosecurity plans on dairy farms is voluntary in almost all countries 
(Kristensen and Jakobsen, 2011), and its success is dependent upon participation of dairy 
farmers in these programs (Barkema et al., 2015). Some difficulties arise in practical 
implementation which are associated with attitudes and behaviors of farmers and 
veterinarians (Frössling and Nöremark, 2016; Moya et al., 2019), the previous experiences 
they have lived, and the importance they can attribute to the biosecurity programs (Renault 
et al., 2018). Although many farmers are aware that biosecurity measures are an effective 
way to prevent diseases, several studies demonstrated that most cattle farmers do not 
implement or implement incorrect biosecurity measures (Moore et al., 2008; Sayers et al., 
2013). Therefore, farmers need to be motivated to change existing behaviors. Furthermore, 
farm workers participation is also necessary to implement effective biosecurity programs 
to decrease risk of pathogen transmission (Mee et al., 2012; Ritter et al., 2017). 
Some studies have described biosecurity measures applied in dairy farms. Most of them 
have been conducted in the United States (Wells et al., 2000; Faust et al., 2001; Hoe et al., 
2006; Villarroel et al., 2007); United Kingdom (Brennan y Christley, 2012; Gates et al., 
2013); Finland (Sahlström et al., 2014); Sweden (Nöremark et al., 2010); Belgium (Sarrazin 
et al., 2014); Ireland (Sayers et al., 2013) and some European countries (Renault, et al., 
2017). In United States reported that 45% of farms introduce cattle each year, 75.5% did 
not require any testing of new cattle, only 20.6% of dairy herds quarantine any cattle and 
15% indicated use of quarantines for at least 7 days. Furthermore, 38% shared heavy 
equipment with other farms; 58.8% had at some point used the same equipment to handle 
manure and animal feed, and of these, 15.2% did not use any cleaning or disinfecting 
procedures for the equipment after manure was handled (Villarroel et al., 2007). In Europe, 
Sayers et al., (2013) described that in Ireland 12% of herds are closed, only 7.6% tested 
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animals following purchase for diseases other than those under statutory control and just 
14.5% farmers implemented correct quarantine procedures. Sarrazin et al., (2014) in 
Belgium, reported that only 12% of the herds purchasing cattle implemented quarantine 
measures; farm-specific boots and clothing for visitors were present in 70% and 66% of the 
farms, respectively. Despite their presence, only in 20% and 13% the studied herds, 
respectively, these measures were used. Luzzago et al., (2008) in Northern Italy concluded 
that dairy farms quarantine never was used. Renault et al., (2017) in Belgium, France and 
Spain reported that less than 10% applied quarantine to incoming animals. In relation to 
veterinarians, 11% wash their boots, 58% change clothes when they look dirty, and reusable 
material was sterilized after each animal by 67% of the veterinarians.  
1.2.4. Measuring biosecurity on dairy farm 
Measuring biosecurity is relevant to evaluate biosecurity level and identifying those 
measures that need to be improved (Dewulf et al., 2018). Several systems have been 
designed to evaluate the biosecurity status of livestock systems. They have been developed 
as check lists or standardized scoring systems based on expert opinion (e.g., farmers, 
veterinarians, and researchers) obtained through structured questionnaires. Evaluation tools 
allow quantifying biosecurity level and classify herds according to their level of 
implementation as well as benchmarking (Luzzago et al., 2008, Laanen et al., 2013). 
Different online tools for the evaluation of biosecurity have been developed. For example, 
the Biocheck from UGent, a risk-based scoring system to evaluate the quality of on-farm 
biosecurity (http://www.biocheck.ugent.be). This system focuses in aspects that are 
common to the transmission of many different types of infectious diseases (Dewulf et al., 
2018). Other authors have developed scoring systems for specific cattle diseases such as 
Paratuberculosis (Raizman et al., 2006) or BVDV (Luzzago et al., 2008; Sarrazin et al., 
2014) that would aid the implementation of a voluntary control program. This kind of tools 
usually shows where efforts can be made to improve biosecurity aspects on the farm. 
However, they do not quantify the risk of pathogens entry and, consequently, the impact of 
biosecurity measures on reducing the probability of introducing diseases can not be 
evaluated  
A tool for decision making to reduce the risk to which a farm is exposed should reflect the 
probability of introduction (Moore et al., 2010). For this purpose, it may be desirable to 
undertake a quantitative analysis, for example, to identify critical steps or to compare 
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sanitary measures. A quantitative risk assessment use mathematical models wich can 
represent reality and the impact of risk management options where the inputs and outputs 
are expressed numerically (Murray et al., 2004). In this context, the development of 
quantitative risk assessment can be a useful method to identify and justify enhanced 
biosecurity measures according to the probability of disease introduction based on objective 
parameters.  
 
1.3. Bovine viral diarrhea virus (BVDV) 
1.3.1. Etiology 
Bovine viral diarrhea virus (BVDV) belong to the pestivirus genus within the Flavivirus 
family (Heinz et al., 2000). Three pestivirus species are described: bovine viral diarrhea 
virus 1 (BVDV‐1), bovine viral diarrhea virus 2 (BVDV‐2) and HoBi‐like virus (often 
referred to as BVDV‐3 or bovine atypical pestivirus (Bauermann et al., 2013). Phylogenetic 
analysis of the three bovine pestiviruses has further classified them into sub‐genotypes and 
identified at least 21 BVDV‐1, three BVDV‐2 and four HoBi‐like sub‐genotypes (Yesilbag 
et al., 2017).  
BVDV 1 and BVDV 2 are antigenically distinct, each genotype may exist as one of two 
biotypes, cytopathic (cp) and noncytopathic (ncp). Cytopathic is the biotype of choice for 
modified live vaccines because ncp viruses from either genotype can cross the placenta and 
establish persistent infections in the fetus (Houe, 1999; Evermann and Ridpath, 2002). 
However, the ncp biotype has been shown to predominate in the field. In persistently 
infected (PI) animals, both biotypes will result in the development of mucosal disease (MD) 
(Fulton et al., 2002). In Europe, at least 11 subgroups (BVDV types 1a–1k) of BVDV 1 
have been described but their biological significance has yet to be examined (Vilcek et al., 
2001).  
1.3.2. Pathogenesis  
BVDV replicates in draining lymph nodes and from there spreads via circulating lymphoid 
cells to the blood. The incubation period of bovine Pestiviruses, upon infection, is between 
6- and 12-days post‐exposure but can fluctuate depending on the strain of the virus, its 
virulence and the virus dose transmitted (Evermann and Barrington, 2005). Viremia can be 
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detected 24 – 48 hours post infection. The course of the viremia is dependent upon the 
presence or absence of colostral antibodies that are believed to persist for up to 6 months of 
age (Baker, 1995).  
1.3.3. Clinical manifestations  
The clinical outcome of infection depends on the infecting viral strain as well as the age, 
immunological status, pregnancy status, gestational age of the fetus, the immune status 
(passive or active immunity from previous infection or vaccination), the level of 
environmental stress, and viral factors which include genomic and antigenic diversity 
among BVDV isolates (Baker, 1995; Grooms, 2004). 
Infection of the dam in <40 days of pregnancy can result in embryonic or fetal mortality, 
whereas infection with a ncp strain between 30 and 120 days of gestation (prior to fetal 
immunocompetence) can result in fetal death, abortion, mummification and most 
importantly, the birth of calves which are immunotolerant to BVDV (i.e., persistently 
infected animals). These animals appear clinically normal, but excrete large quantities of 
virus into the environment throughout its life being the most important reservoir of virus, 
as a result, they are critical for the maintenance and circulation of BVDV in the field (Kahrs, 
2001; Smith and Grotelueschen, 2004; Thurmond, 2005). In addition, PI animals are 
predisposed to secondary infections due to their reduced immune function and tend to have 
significantly reduced growth and production performance compared to their peers, thus, 
lifespan of PI animals is significantly shorter (Peterhans et al., 2010). However, some PI 
animals might remain clinically unaffected, seronegative and may breed satisfactorily, and 
they will then transmit the infection to the fetus, which will always be PI. In most infected 
bovine herds, the prevalence of PIs is estimated to be lower than 1%, although variation 
occurs (Houe, 1995).  
Fetal infections during 120–180 days (mid to late gestation) result the birth of weak calves 
or calves with congenital or physical malformations, such as ocular (i.e., retinal atrophy, 
cataracts) or cerebellar lesions (i.e., cerebellar hypoplasia) and growth retardation with 
arrested bone development, and pulmonary hypoplasia (Grooms, 2004; Evermann and 
Barrington, 2005). Calves congenitally infected with BVDV are more likely to develop 
severe diseases in the first 4–5 months of life (Muñoz-Zanzi et al., 2003). 
Cattle older than 6 months of age (without maternal immunity) could develop an acute 
infection after an incubation period between 5–7 days and a viremia that last up to 15 days 
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(Grooms et al., 2002). Transiently infected (TI) animals might present only mild clinical 
signs, but might suffer immunosuppression, increasing susceptibility to secondary 
infections (Grooms, 2004). TI cattle shed low levels of virus in body secretions and 
excretions from days 3 to 15 post infection, although shedding has been shown to last for 
up to 3 weeks (Thurmond, 2005). 
Mucosal disease is a sporadic condition where <5% of herds are affected, but in outbreaks 
up to 25% of a herd may be infected. The incubation period elapsed 7–14 days and clinical 
signs include fever and profuse watery diarrhea. Erosions and ulcers may be present on the 
oral cavity, interdigital regions, teats, vulva, and prepuce (Grooms et al., 2002). 
In camels and llamas, it has been described diarrhea, abortion, and ill thrift in pregnant 
llamas, and congenital defects in camel calves (Goyal et al., 2002; Yousif et al.,2004). In 
wildlife, such as axis deer, roe deer, and moose, include fever, corneal opacity, and 
depression. The severity of the disease appears to depend upon the viral strain, immune 
competence of the host animal, concurrent viral infection, and/or nutritional deficiencies, 
such as copper (Van Campen et al., 2001). 
1.3.4. Epidemiology  
1.3.4.1. Susceptible Hosts and reservoirs 
The host range for BVDV includes all ungulates belonging to the order Artiodactyla (Van 
Campen, et al., 2001). Cattle and other domestic animals that can be infected with BVDV 
include sheep, goats, and members of the Camelidae family (camels, llamas, and alpacas) 
(Van Campen, et al., 2001; Goyal et al., 2002). Understanding the epidemiological 
importance of non-bovine hosts in the spread of BVDV is essential, particularly in countries 
where co-grazing of cattle and other susceptible species is common or those that have large 
populations of wild ruminants (Evans et al., 2019). 
1.3.4.2. Virus transmission 
Transplacental infection occurs when susceptible cows are exposed to BVDV during 
pregnancy, or when a PI cow becomes pregnant (Houe, 1995). Pregnant dams carrying PI 
calves are often referred to as “Trojan Cows” (Lindberg et al., 2001). Congenital infection 
of the fetus prior 125 days of gestation, it can result in the birth of a PI calf (Thurmond, 
2005). 
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Horizontal transmission depends on the prevalence of PI animals, the rate of animal-to-
animal contacts, the virulence of the virus strain(s), and the susceptibility of the cattle to the 
strains in the herd (Thurmond, 2005). Direct contact between an infected animal, 
particularly PIs and a susceptible animal is the most effective route for BVDV transmission, 
and usually result in transient infection (Niskanen and Lindberg, 2003). TI animals may 
remain infected for only a few days or weeks depending on the virulence of strains of 
BVDV (Niskanen et al., 2000). Thus, BVDV transmission and persistence of the infection 
within the herd will be limited (Lindberg and Houe, 2005). However, a few reports suggest 
that BVDV may persist in a herd in absence of PI animals (Moen et al., 2005; Collins et al., 
2009) although other experimental studies do not support this (Nickell et al., 2011; Sarrazin 
et al., 2014). The full extent of viral shedding and persistence of virus in TIs and their ability 
to maintain infection within a population needs further investigation (Evans et al., 2019). 
The main spread route of BVDV between herds is the contact with infected animals, through 
cattle movement (i.e., animal trade, common pastures, participation in cattle competitions), 
and indirect contact with secretions of infected animals contaminating bans, fomites, 
equipment, machinery and personal (Gunn, 1993; Lindberg and Alenius, 1999; Niskanen 
and Lindberg, 2003). The survival of BVDV in the environment and on equipment/clothing 
represent an important risk of indirect sources to the spread of BVDV within and between 
herds (Niskanen and Lindberg, 2003; Evans et al., 2019). The contribution of Trojan cows 
on the spread of infection between herds is limited, however they account for approximately 
10% of PI births in the absence of effective control measures (Reardon et al., 2018). 
Environmental stability of each of the viruses under different conditions (e.g., temperature, 
humidity, matrix) and their survival outside of the host is essential in understanding the role 
of fomites on the spread BVDV to susceptible hosts (Evans et al., 2019). In addition, 
conditions that favor crowding and aerosol transmission would increase the likelihood of 
BVDV transmission from calves with a respiratory form of BVDV infection (Baule et al., 
2001).   
Although the major routes of BVDV transmission are well known, cases of new infections 
appear despite strict biosecurity measures in areas with a systematic control. In 40-50% of 
these cases where new infections are detected in previously free herds, the route of 
transmission remains unidentified (Stahl and Alenius, 2012). 
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1.3.4.3. Geographical distribution  
BVDV infection has a worldwide distribution, with large regional differences, being 
endemic in countries with higher bovine production, high herd density, and in all countries 
where no systematic control has been initiated (Houe, 2003; Lindberg et al., 2006).  
In many European countries, the infection seems to have occurred endemically with about 
half the herds having PI animals and most herds having antibody carriers. The overall 
prevalence of PI animals is often in the range of 1–2% and the seropositive cattle in the 
range of 40–70% (Houe, 1995; Houe, 1999; Rüfenacht et al., 2000; Sarrazin et al., 2013). 
In European countries without BVD control programs there is a large regional variation, 
with a range of herd seroprevalence of 3.8-65.5% and within herd seroprevalence between 
0.1-3.8% (Tab. 1). The prevalence of herds with PI animals varies between 1% and 50%, 
while the prevalence of PI animals in the herds has been reported to be between 0.06% and 
1.3-2%. In the case of Spain, the studies carried out determined a seroprevalence at the herd 
level between 70.9-94.2% (Fig. 1) and 21-65.6% in the animals (Fig.2) (Sanibos-Anembe, 
2018). 
 
Country Herd prevalence Within herd prevalence  
Belgium  3.8%-5% 0.1%-0.6% 
France  21.5% (20.9%-22%) 2.90% 
Germany 45.3% 0.9%-1.5% 
Ireland 49.6% 0.75% 
Italy  12.70%  
Portugal  9.7% (5.1%-16.3%)  
Spain  26% 0.7% 
Sweden  0.8% (0-2.7%)  
Switzerland 2% 0.24% 
The Netherlands  10-15% 2.22-3.86%  
United Kingdom 65.5% 0.4%-1.8% 
Table 1: Seroprevalence of Bovine viral diarrhea virus in Europe (Modified of Foddai et al., 2014; 
Santman-Berends et al., 2017) 
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Figure 1: Herd BVDV prevalence in Spain. Available online: https://www.anembe.com/grupos- 
de-trabajo/sanibos 
 
Figure 2: Within herd BVDV prevalence in Spain. Available online: 
https://www.anembe.com/grupos- de-trabajo/sanibos 
 
1.3.4.4. Risk Factors  
The most important risk factors identified for BVDV infection were acquisition of new 
animals (i.e., purchasing transiently or persistently animals, or pregnant cattle that give birth 
to PI calves) without control of viral status (Brock, 2004; Luzzago et al., 2008; Amelung et 
al., 2018 Lindberg and Houe, 2005) or being in contact with animals from other farms 
(Lindberg and Alenius, 1999). On the other hand, the relationship between herd size and 
the risk of infection suggests that large herds are at a higher risk of BVDV infection than 
small herds (Bishop et al., 2010; Amelung et al., 2018). The number of animals in a herd is 
a complex risk factor because it is difficult to isolate from other factors, such as cattle 
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density, herd density and contact between different herds (Lindberg and Houe, 2005). 
However, the low density of herds and cattle are associated with the lower herd prevalence 
(Almeida et al., 2013), while higher prevalence’s were found in regions with a high density 
of cattle (Ståhl et al., 2008). Finally, positive BVDV status in dairy farms also was 
associated with the number of contacts on dairy farms (Presi et al., 2011; Amelung et al., 
2018).  
1.3.5. Diagnostic 
Antibody testing is commonly used as a screening tool for herds to identify animals which 
have been exposed to the virus and those which are susceptible to infection. Antibodies 
diagnostic tests include enzyme linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA), virus neutralization 
test (VNT) or, less often, agarose gel immunodiffusion (AGID) and indirect 
immunofluorescent test (IFAT) (Saliki and Dubovi, 2004). Other methods commonly used 
include antigen capture ELISAs (ACE) which can be used to test blood, milk and tissue 
samples; real‐time polymerase chain reaction (RT‐PCR) used to test blood, milk, semen 
and tissue samples and immunohistochemistry used to test fixed tissue samples such as ear 
notches. Those tests allow to identify PI animals and TI animals during period of viral 
excretion (4–15 days after infection) (Fulton et al., 2006; Hilbe et al., 2007; Dubovi, 2013).  
To date there is no diagnostic test capable of detecting Trojan cows with high diagnostic 
sensitivity and specificity for preventing spread, persistence, and re-introduction BVDV 
infection (Lanyon and Reichel, 2014). Identifying Trojan cows prior to the birth of PI calves 
will provide significant improvements to control efforts (Evans et al., 2019). A preferable 
alternate strategy to representative random sampling of imported live animal populations 
might be to control testing all the calves born from imported pregnant animals (Alpay et al., 
2019). 
1.3.6. Control and Eradication  
Bovine viral diarrhea has been placed on the OIE's list of notifiable diseases, mainly as a 
result of its potential for international spread, but is controlled mostly on a voluntary basis 
(Lindberg and Houe, 2005).While there are currently no formal reporting requirements for 
BVD, countries with national or regional control programs may have certain regulations for 
affiliated farmers that effectively restrict trade with animals of positive suspect or unknown 
BVD status (Marschik et al., 2018). 
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Control programs aim to reduce disease prevalence to a relatively low and manageable 
level, the fundamental principle of any BVD control and eradication program aims to 
provide a continued absence of the disease in the population based on reduce the prevalence 
of PI animals in a population and prevent the apparition of new PI animals (Houe et al., 
2006). Several European countries with compulsory and systematic control programs differ 
in the way how PI animals are detected and in the role of vaccines (Bachofen et al., 2013). 
The strategies in Scandinavian countries are considered a general model of BVD control 
based on three central elements 1) biosecurity, to prevent introduction of infection into free 
herds; 2) elimination of PI animals in infected herds to reduce virus circulation; and 3) 
continuous monitoring of free herds for early detection of reinfection (Lindberg and 
Alenius, 1999).  
At this moment, the Scandinavian countries are free of BVDV (Houe, 2005) and control or 
eradication programs are in place in Austria, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Germany, 
Ireland, and Scotland (Houe et al., 2006; Presi et al., 2011;B; Voas, 2012). Regional 
approaches to BVD control have also been implemented in Brittany in France, in some 
regions of Italy (Lecco, Como and Roma) as well as in Greece and in Spain such is the case 
of Galicia (Lindberg et al., 2006).  
At farm level, biosecurity constitutes the most central element of BVDV control, the main 
measures are summarized in refuse the purchase of pregnant and seropositive cattle or to 
isolate the resultant calf should be isolated until testing can confirm it is not PI (Bitsch et 
al., 2000). Also, testing of individual calves as soon as possible after birth allows early 
removal of PI animals (Brock, 2004; Smith et al., 2014). Recommended measures include 
double fencing on boundary fences, testing of newly purchased animals, quarantining newly 
purchased animals and the cleaning of equipment and vehicles shared across properties 
(Evans et al., 2019). In general, the education of farmers is an important tool to avoid that 
new infected animals are introduced (Lindberg and Alenius, 1999). 
• Vaccination  
The original purpose of vaccination against BVD was prevention of clinical disease and 
transient immunosuppression caused by BVDV. Thus, vaccination did not necessarily 
prevent the emergence of new PI cattle, the virus reservoir was maintained, and infection 
of susceptible animals continued (Moennig and Becher, 2018). Currently, vaccination 
programs are designed to prevent clinical disease, protect against viremia and to prevent 
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fetal infection. Although, the efficacy of these vaccines in field observations have been 
questioned, because birth of PI calves is not completely prevented after vaccination 
(Rodning et al., 2010; Stahl and Alenius, 2012). However, it has recently been shown that 
vaccinating calves against BVD can result in markedly different immune responses and 
improved growth rates compared to unvaccinated calves which are exposed to PI cattle 
(Grooms et al., 2014).  
1.3.7. Impact over livestock industry  
The overall disease impact depends of its effect in production/economics, animal welfare 
or human safety. However, the welfare implications have never been quantified in a 
systematic way (Lindberg et al., 2006). Several studies include main economic estimates in 
outbreaks and the major variation is believed to be due to biological variation rather than 
currency fluctuations. The most losses are associated with reproductive disorders and PI 
animals, in other cases losses from outbreaks due to BVD occurring simultaneously with 
other infections (Houe, 2003). In addition, BVDV infections have a significant impact on 
the competitiveness of European cattle industries (Lindberg, 2006).  
The production losses include reduced milk production, reduced conception rate, 
respiratory disorders, other diseases, and death among animals acquiring acute infection. 
Fetal infection causes abortions, congenital defects, and growth retardation. On the other 
hand, fetal infection also leads to PI calves, which are often small and unthrifty, increased 
susceptibility to other diseases, and may eventually die from mucosal disease (Houe, 2003). 
Several studies reported the direct costs of a BVDV infection in dairy herds varied between 
€21 and €135 per cow but could be as high as €340 per cow when simultaneously other 
infections occurred or in case of highly virulent strains (Houe, 2003; Valle et al., 2005; 
Lindberg et al., 2006). The average annual net costs were estimated at €27.8 million for the 
dairy industry (Santman-Berends et al., 2015). 
 
1.4. Bovine herpesvirus-1 (BoHV-1) 
1.4.1. Etiology  
Bovine herpesvirus-1 (BoHV-1) belongs to the genus Varicellovirus in the subfamily 
Alphaherpesvirinae under the family Herpesviridae. It is closely related to pseudorabies 
virus (Suid herpesvirus type 1) and varicella-zoster (chickenpox) virus (human herpesvirus 
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type 3) (Biswas et al., 2013). According genomic analysis, BoHV-1 virus can be divided 
into several subtypes antigenically similar like BoHV-1.1 related to the respiratory 
syndrome, BoHV-1.2 related to genital infections, and BoHV-1.3/BoHV-5 associated with 
neurological disorders of the cattle (Keuser et al., 2004; Muylkens et al., 2007). BoHV-1 is 
resistant to environmental influences, at 4°C, the virus is stable for 1 month and may survive 
for more than 30 days in feed. The virus is sensitive to many disinfectants and is readily 
inactivated (Nandi et al. 2009). 
1.4.2. Pathogenesis 
BoHV-1 replicates in the periphery, i.e. the mucous membranes of either the respiratory or 
the genital tract. In the respiratory tract cause inflammatory changes such as rhinitis, 
laryngitis and tracheitis leading to destruction of the tracheal microvilli (Leite et al., 2002). 
Acute infection leads to high levels of virus production and secretion in ocular, oral, nasal, 
or genital cavities for 7–10 days after infection (Jones, 2019). After recovery, BoHV-1 
establish a state of latency probably for the entire life of the host through enter the axons of 
local nerve cells, its reach the neuron bodies through trigeminal ganglion or pharyngeal 
tonsils following primary infection of the conjunctiva, oral and/or nasal cavities; in the 
sacral ganglia following genital infection (Winkler et al, 2000). The reactivation of the 
latent infection can be due to stressful conditions such as transport, parturition, animal 
movement and mixing, inclement weather concomitant infection, poor husbandry or diet, 
overcrowding or following treatment with corticosteroids and coinfection with other 
pathogens (Winkler et al., 2000; Muylkens et al. 2007). Latent infection should always be 
considered a potential source of infection, it can reactivate the virus, resulting in re-
excretion of virus and a rise in neutralizing antibodies (Jones, 2019). 
1.4.3. Clinical manifestations 
After an incubation period of 2–4 days, the clinical manifestation of BoHV-1 include 
abortion, suboptimal fertility, respiratory disease, reduced milk production, and increased 
mortality (Muylkens et al., 2007), the clinical signs depend on subtype affecting:  
• BoHV-1 subtypes 1 and 2a (respiratory infection), characterized by high fever, 
conjunctivitis, mucopurulent nasal discharge, and abortion at the end of the fifth month of 
pregnancy, with expulsion of dead fetus (Muylkens et al., 2007). Secondary bacterial (e.g. 
 
 
26 
M. haemolytica, P. multocida and H. somnis) or viral agents may result in severe respiratory 
diseases in young animals that can lead to the death (Holliman et al., 2005). 
• BoHV-1. subtype 2b (genital infection) causes acute infectious pustular 
vulvovaginitis (IPV) in cows and infectious pustular balanoposthitis (IPB) in bulls. The 
incubation period for the genital forms of BoHV-1 is 2–6 day, usually develops 1–3 days 
after mating. Initial clinical signs are frequent urination and a mild vaginal infection, 
animals infected development pustules, ulcers in the mucosa of vulva and vagina, in the 
case of male lesions similar on the mucosa of the penis and prepuce (Muylkens et al., 2007).  
• BoHV-1. subtype 3 (neurological disease) similar to encephalitis, but the 
importance is the development of latency (Woodbine et al., 2009).  
1.4.4. Epidemiology  
1.4.4.1. Susceptible hosts and reservoirs  
BoHV-1 infected cattle and other Artiodactyla and cause disease in cattle, sheep, and goats 
(Biswas et al., 2013). However, sheep is unlikely to play any role in BoHV-1 transmission 
(Hage et al., 1997). Viruses antigenically related to BoHV-1 and BoHV-5 have also been 
isolated from several ruminant species including red deer, reindeer, mule deer, water 
buffalo, goats, elk, pronghorn antelope and wildebeest (Thiry et al., 2006). For this reason, 
buffalo and wildlife may play an important role in the maintenance of the infection 
(Boelaert et al., 2000).  
1.4.4.2. Virus transmission  
BoHV-1 is shed in nasal discharge for 10–14 days during acute respiratory infection and 
transmission occurs by contact with mucosal droplets from infected cattle (Kahrs, 2001). 
Infected cattle excrete the virus and can infect susceptible animals by nose to nose contact, 
and by coughing and sneezing aerosolized droplets (Raaperi et al., 2010). Survival of virus 
in secretions could contaminate clothing and fomites and presents a risk of indirect 
transmission between farms (Nettleton and Russel, 2017). Airborne transmission of BoHV-
1 over short distances within a building has been also demonstrated (Mars et al., 2000). In 
addition, virus can be transmitted by contaminated semen during natural mating or artificial 
insemination (Van Oirschot, 1995).  
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1.4.4.3. Geographical distribution 
BoHV-1 is widespread all over the world. There are significant differences in herd level 
prevalence and disease incidence between and within regions, depending on geography and 
cattle management practices (Woodbine et al., 2009). Herd prevalence in Europe has been 
described between 15-80% and within herd prevalence between 12-64% (Table 2). In Spain 
it is known there is a variation between 45.8-81.8% in herd prevalence (Fig. 3) and within 
prevalence between 25-45.8% (Fig. 4) (Sanibos-Anembe, 2018). In 2018, the latest report 
of the national control program describes herd prevalence of 33.71% (n=89) in dairy farms 
(https://www.mapa.gob.es/es/ganaderia/temas/sanidad-animal-higiene-ganadera/sanidad-
animal/enfermedades/IBR.aspx). 
   
Country Herd prevalence Within herd prevalence  
Belgium  67% 35.9% 
England and Gales  69% 42.5% 
France 36% 1.40% 
Ireland 77.3%  
Italy  84.3%-100% 35%-38.7% 
Spain 50.4%-70.4% 38.4%-45.7% 
The Netherlands 84% 30% 
Table 2: Seroprevalence of Bovine herpesvirus 1 in Europe. (Modified to Raaperi et al., 2014) 
 
 
Figure 3: Herd BoHV-1 prevalence in Spain. Available online: https://www.anembe.com/grupos-
de-trabajo/sanibos 
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Figure 4: Within herd BoHV-1 prevalence in Spain. Available online: 
https://www.anembe.com/grupos-de-trabajo/sanibos  
 
1.4.4.4. Risk factors  
Several studies have identified risk factors for BoHV-1 seropositivity. Age (i.e., calves have 
a lower prevalence of infection), sex (males are more frequently positive than females) and 
herd size (large herds higher seroprevalence than small) have been reported (Boeleart et al., 
2005; Cowley et al., 2011). In addition, larger herds, due to their higher number of contacts 
both within the herd and with other herds through cattle purchases and a higher number of 
visitors has been identified as a risk factor (Woodbine et al., 2009, Sayers et al., 2015). 
Farm density or cattle density may also increase the risk of BoHV-1 introduction because a 
continuous influx of susceptible animals keeps virus circulation (Van Schaik et al., 2002; 
Raaperi et al., 2010). 
Contact with other animals during purchase of cattle and participation in shows allowing 
cattle to return to a farm if not sold at market or grazing cattle on other farm were also found 
to be important risk factors for the introduction of BoHV-1 increasing the probability to 
exposure to other viral types BoHV- 1 (Nardelli et al., 2008; Woodbine et al., 2009). In 
addition, the movement of animals to and mixing within new herds is stressful for cattle 
and can result in recrudescence of latent infection, and subsequently spreading to 
susceptible animals (Woodbine et al., 2009). 
Other factors such as professional visitors not using farm protective clothing and herds 
situated close to other BoHV-1 positive herds (Van Schaik et al., 1998), and farms with 
mixed dairy and beef cattle have a higher risk of being seropositive than dairy-only holdings 
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(Boelaert et al., 2005). The presence of a breeding bull might also increase the risk of 
infection (Nettleton and Russel, 2017).  
1.4.5. Diagnostic 
Several serological tests are available for the detection of antibody against BoHV-1 
infection. A variety of ELISAs have been employed to screen serum samples or bulk tank 
milk in dairy farms (Nandi et al., 2009). The disadvantage of bulk milk analysis, however, 
is that reflects data related to the lactating herd only, the disease status of which may differ 
from that of younger livestock in the herd (Sayers, 2017). 
The PCR assay is as sensitive as virus isolation and is a practical alternative for the rapid 
detection of virus in nasal swabs, bovine fetal serum, and semen samples (Nandi et al., 
2009). It has been shown to be the most effective way of confirming BoHV-1 in bovine 
abortions (Crook et al., 2012).Virus isolation in cell culture and fluorescent antibody tests 
have been replaced by PCR tests are useful for detecting small amounts of virus in 
diagnostic samples (Wang et al., 2007). The virus neutralization test (VNT) has been widely 
used and is the gold standard by which other techniques have been evaluated, but it requires 
cell culture facilities and is time-consuming (Biswas et al., 2013). 
1.4.6. Control and Eradication  
The control and eventual eradication of BoHV-1 is based on the detection and removal of 
infected animals, with or without the use of marker vaccines (Nettleton and Russel, 2017). 
Other control measures include three fundamental bans: purchasing positive animals, using 
whole-virus BoHV-1 vaccines, and inseminating cows with semen from positive bulls 
(Nardelli et al., 2008). OIE guidelines recommend 2–3 weeks quarantine period for newly 
introduced cattle after which only BoHV-1 seronegative cattle are admitted to the herd 
(Boelaert et al., 2005).  
Several European countries have either successful BoHV-1 eradication programs 
(Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Austria, Switzerland, Norway, Federal State of Bavaria in 
Germany and province of Bolzano, Italy) and now are officially free of Infectious bovine 
rhinotracheitis (IBR). Others implemented an EU-approved compulsory program 
(Germany) (Nardelli et al., 2008), and in Spain since 2019 a national voluntary program is 
established (RD 554/2019). In addition, voluntary regional BoHV-1 control programs in 
specified herds are ongoing (Ackermann and Engels, 2006). 
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Figure 5: IBR situation in Europe 2018. (Mapa.gob.es, 2018) 
• Vaccination 
The vaccines reduce the severity of disease, virus replication and transmission, prevent the 
excretion of wild virus by naive animals and prevent re-excretion by latently infected ones, 
but they are not able to prevent BoHV-1 infection (Ackerman and Engels, 2006; van Drunen 
Littel-van den Hurk, 2006). There are four kinds of vaccines: modified live virus vaccines 
(MLV), inactivated vaccines, subunit vaccines and gE-deleted marker vaccines that are 
available to be used in cattle against BoHV-1 infections. MLV vaccines are potentially 
abortigenic and cannot be used in non-immune pregnant cattle and may develop the latent 
state that may lead to shedding of the vaccine virus (Nandi et al., 2009). Inactivated vaccines 
do not prevent the development of latency following exposure to field virus, but they are 
safe in pregnant animals, stable in storage and do not cause the shedding of virus (Castrucci 
et al., 2002). The use of marker vaccines is recommended as it offers the differentiation of 
vaccinated and naturally infected animals (Nandi et al., 2009). 
Marker vaccines based on gE deletion mutants are widely used in Europe, either in live or 
inactivated forms. Live gE-negative vaccine induced better protection than inactivated gE-
negative. In contrast, inactivated gE vaccines were more efficacious than attenuated gE 
vaccine at reducing virus excretion after reactivation. However, vaccination cannot prevent 
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latency, either of the vaccine itself or of the wild virus. Therefore, to eradicate BoHV-1, 
repeated vaccination according to a strict schedule to reduce the possibility of wild virus 
excretion and strict management practices are required (van Drunen Littel-van den Hurk, 
2006). 
1.4.7. Impact over livestock industry  
The introduction of BoHV-1 into a cattle farm can cause negative economic impact due to 
production losses and restrictions in the international trade of livestock. The main economic 
losses due to weight loss, decrease in milk production, abortions, a high insemination index 
in breeding animals, and increase in median calving date associated with inferior fertility 
(Nandi et al., 2009; Raaperi et al., 2012). Longer calving intervals and increased young 
stock and cow culling rates also are described (Raaperi et al., 2014). 
Statham et al. (2015) reported a milk yield loss of 2.6 kg/d in BoHV-1 seropositive 
compared with seronegative dairy cows. A Dutch modeling exercise quantified losses of 
0.92 kg of milk per cow per day during a BoHV- 1 herd outbreak (Van Schaik et al., 1999), 
and Sayers et al., (2007) found a 250 liter reduction in milk yield per multiparous cow per 
year in BoHV-1 positive herds.  
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The general aim of this PhD thesis was to develop a risk assessment tool to support 
the decision making in relation to biosecurity measures prioritization in dairy 
farms. 
The specific objectives that have guided this PhD research are: 
• To develop a quantitative risk assessment to estimate the probability of 
Bovine viral diarrhea virus (BVDV) and Bovine herpesvirus type 1 (BoHV-
1) introduction through animal movements based on the biosecurity 
measures applied in dairy farms in Catalonia and Galicia;  
• To quantify the probability of BVDV and BoHV-1 introduction through 
indirect contacts using a quantitative risk assessment tool applied in dairy 
farms. 
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3.1. Abstract  
A quantitative risk assessment model was developed to estimate the annual probability 
of introduction of bovine viral diarrhea virus (BVDV) and bovine herpesvirus 1 (BoHV-
1) at the farm level through animal movments. Data from 2017 official animal 
movements, biosecurity questionnaires, scientific literature and expert opinion from 
field veterinarians were taken into consideration for model input parameters. Purchased 
cattle or cattle introductions, rearing replacement-heifers offsite, showing cattle at 
competitions, sharing transport vehicles with other herds, and transporting cattle in 
vehicles that have not been cleaned and disinfected were considered in the model. 
Results showed that the annual probability of introducing BVDV or BoHV-1 through 
infected animals was very heterogeneous between farms. The median likelihood of 
BVDV and BoHV-1introduction was 12% and 9%, respectively. Farms that purchased 
cattle from their same region (i.e., local movements) and shared transport with other 
farms had the higher probability for BVDV and BoHV-1 introduction. This model can 
be a useful tool to support decision making on biosecurity measures that should be 
prioritized to reduce the probability of introduction of these two viruses in dairy herds. 
 
3.2. Introduction  
Bovine viral diarrhea (BVD) caused by BVD virus (BVDV), and infectious bovine 
rhinotracheitis (IBR) caused by bovine herpesvirus-1 (BoHV-1) are two diseases of 
importance in dairy herds because of their impacts on reproductive performance, 
increased susceptibility to other diseases, early culling, and subsequent economic losses 
(Hage et al., 1998; Muylkens et al., 2007; Newcomer and Givens, 2016). Animals infected 
by BVDV can develop three different infection status: (i) persistently infected (PI) cattle, 
which are animals vertically infected during early pregnancy (30 to 120 days) that shed 
large amounts of virus all their life (Houe, 1999); (ii) transiently infected (TI) cattle, 
which are animals horizontally infected after birth that shed small amounts of virus for 
up to 15 days (Houe, 1999; Niskanen et al., 2000); and (iii) Trojan cows (TR), which are 
pregnant cows that carry a PI calf (Reardon et al., 2018). Cattle with BoHV-1 can develop 
acute infections (AI) shed the virus during a short period of time, followed by a latent 
infection (LI) for the rest or their lives, in when they can excrete the virus under stress 
conditions (Lazic et al., 2003). Cattle movements are considering the main routes of 
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BVDV and BoHV-1 spread between herds (Van Schaik et al., 1998; Lindberg and 
Alenius, 1999; Van Schaik et al., 2002).  
Several European countries have implemented compulsory and voluntary BVD and IBR 
control and eradication programs (Lindberg et al., 2006; Nardelli et al., 2008). The 
implementation of biosecurity is considered an essential pillar in these programs. 
Different studies have described biosecurity measures in cattle farms (e.g., Sahlström et 
al., 2014; Sarrazin et al., 2014a), and several methods have been developed score different 
levels of biosecurity practices implemented on farms. Existing methods to evaluate 
biosecurity practices use checklists to support the development of on-farm biosecurity 
plans (https://www.farmbiosecurity.com.au), or to score the level of biosecurity measures 
implemented on farms based on those measures that are common to the transmission of 
different types of infectious agents, such as Biocheck.UGent™ (Laanen et al., 2014). In 
addition, several studies have identified biosecurity gaps as risk factors associated with 
disease outbreaks and, therefore, have provided relevant information for disease 
prevention (e.g., Almeida et al., 2013; Machado et al., 2016). However, the development 
of risk assessment models to evaluate the effect of biosecurity measures in the probability 
of disease introduction to support decision making on which practices should be 
prioritized according to farm-specific risks has received less attention. Biosecurity 
programs need to be flexible and adaptable to the particular situations on each farm 
(Wells, 2000; Brennan and Christley, 2012). In this context, quantitative risk assessment 
(Murray et al., 2004) can be a useful method to identify and justify the enhancement of 
biosecurity measures based on the probability of disease introduction. 
The aim of the present study was to develop a quantitative risk assessment model to 
identify farm-specific biosecurity measures that should be implemented to reduce the 
probability of BVDV and BoHV-1 introduction into dairy cattle herds through animal 
movements. 
 
3.3. Materials and Methods 
3.3.1. Data 
A structured questionnaire was used to obtain data on biosecurity measures on 34 and 93 
farms from Catalonia and Galicia, respectively, which voluntarily participated in the 
project. The biosecurity questionnaire (available under request in Spanish) was structured 
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in four parts: i) general data of the farm; ii) animal movements (e.g., origin of the animals, 
frequency of introductions, test, quarantine facilities, external rearing farms, cattle fairs, 
pasture, etc.); iii) vehicles (e.g., vehicles enter inside farm perimeter, vehicles can come 
with other animals, etc.); and iv) visitors and staff (e.g., external workers, frequency of 
visitors, use of protective clothing, etc.). The Autonomous Governments of Catalonia and 
Galicia provided records of cattle movements (national and international) of year 2017. 
Movements were registered at the animal level, and included the following information: 
calving date, movement date, country of origin, and a unique code of destination. Based 
on the calving date and movement date, the age of each purchased animal was calculated. 
For BVDV, we classified introduced cows and heifers into one of three groups: i) less 
than 12 months old; ii) from 12 to 24 months old; and iii) greater than 24 months old. 
Based on published research reports, PI animals were classified into one of the first two 
groups, while TI animals were into any group. Trojan cows could only be classified into 
one of the last two groups. For BoHV-1, introduced cattle were classified into one of two 
groups (i.e. < 24 months, ≥ 24 months), as disease prevalence can vary by age (Mars et 
al., 2001; Lassen et al., 2012; Sayers et al., 2015). The pregnancy status of introduced 
animals and an estimate of their days of gestation were provided for each study farm.  
3.3.2. Risk release pathways 
Field veterinarians responsible for the health management of farms involved in the 
project were invited to participate in the development of the risk assessment model. One 
discussion group was organized to debate about risk release pathways and risk 
mitigating measures that should be included in the model. Five veterinarians attended a 
group discussion meeting (Appendix Table A1). After the group discussion, variables 
for introduction of new animals through purchase of cattle, movements of reared 
replacement heifers offsite, movements to cattle competitions, share transport vehicles 
with others farms, and transport of cattle in vehicles that have not been properly cleaned 
and disinfected (i.e., contaminated transport vehicle) were considered for inclusion in 
the model. Movements to pasture were included in the biosecurity questionnaire, but 
they were not considered in the model because it was not a common practice in dairy 
cattle in the area under study. In Figure 1, parameters considered in the pathway for the 
‘purchase of animals’ are shown. Parameters considered for the movement of animals 
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to cattle competitions and reared replacement heifers offsite are presented in Appendix 
Figure A1 and Figure A2. 
Figure 1: Pathway for bovine viral diarrhea virus and bovine herpesvirus-1 introduction in dairy cattle 
herds through the purchase of animals; Q: Quarantine; T: Test on quarantine; R: Quarantine routines. PI: 
Persistently infected with Bovine Viral Diarrhea Virus; AI: Acutely infected with Bovine Herpesvirus-1; 
FN: False negative 
3.3.3. Model development 
To estimate the probability of introduction of BVDV and BoHV-1 into a dairy cattle farm 
in a 12-month period, a stochastic risk assessment model was developed by using the 
mc2d package (Pouillot and Delignette-Muller, 2010) implemented in R (R Development 
Core Team 2008). Monte Carlo simulations (10,000 iterations) were performed, and all 
non-fixed input parameters were included as uncertain parameters.  
Probability of purchasing an infected animal 
In the analysis, using the cattle movement database, the origin of cattle purchased from 
other farms was France, The Netherlands, Catalonia, Galicia, or the rest of Spain. 
Accordingly, cattle movements were classified into one of these five origins. We assumed 
that the number of cattle purchased in each batch throughout the year had the same 
number of animals. Therefore, the number of animals purchased each time (i.e., the size 
of the batch) from each country/area, group age and farm (data obtained from the 
biosecurity questionnaires) was calculated using the equation [1] (Appendix Table A2). 
The probability that at least one animal from a batch coming from a single farm of a 
certain country/area was already infected with BVDV or BoHV-1 was estimated using 
the equation [2] (Appendix Table A2). Herd and within-herd prevalence values were 
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obtained through a literature review and personal contacts with experts from the countries. 
Values from Catalonia and Galicia were obtained from previous work conducted in these 
areas (Benavides et al., 2018). In the case of BVDV, herds with presence of young cattle 
that tested seropositive or detection of the virus within cattle herds were considered an 
indication the virus was circulating in those herds. 
In Table 1, the different input distributions used in the model are described. Probability 
distributions were used to account for uncertainty in parameter estimates. Uniform 
distributions were reported as minimum and maximum values, and they were used as 
inputs obtained from the literature (i.e., BVDV and BoHV-1 prevalence, diagnostic test 
performance, BVDV transmission probability). PERT distributions were used for BVDV 
survival in different materials where the minimum, maximum, and the most likely value 
was the time in hours that the virus could survive. 
Parameter  Distribution/Values References  
Bovine Viral Diarrhea Virus 
Herd prevalence in France  Uniform (0.21-0.22) Santman Berends et al., 2017 
Herd prevalence in the 
Netherlands  
Uniform (0.16-0.18) Van Duijn et al., 2019 ; Santman-
Berends et al., 2015 
Herd prevalence in Spain Uniform (0.26-0.71) Foddai et al., 2014 ; Gómez-
Pacheco et al., 2009 
Herd prevalence in Catalonia  Uniform (0.54-0.57)  Benavides et al., 2018  
Herd prevalence in Galicia  Uniform (0.03-0.16) Benavides et al., 2018 
Viremic animal  Uniform (0.022-0.029) Foddai et al., 2014 ; Meyling et al. 
1990 
PI1 animal prevalence (<12 
months) 
Uniform (0.0002- 0.02) Bachofen et al., 2013 ; Joly et 
al.2005 
PI animal prevalence (12 to 
24 months) * 
Uniform (0.0001-0.01) Ezanno et al., 2007 
Sensitivity of ELISA (Abs)2 Uniform (0.93-0.98) Hanon et al., 2018 
Specificity of ELISA (Abs) Uniform (0.94-0.99) Hanon et al., 2018 
Sensitivity of ELISA (Ag)3 Uniform (0.97-1) Mars and Van Maanen et al., 2005 
Specificity of ELISA (Ag) Uniform (0.99-0.995) Mars and Van Maanen et al., 2005  
Sensitivity of PCR Fixed Value (0.99) Hilbe et al., 2007 
Specificity of PCR Fixed Value (1) Hilbe et al., 2007 
Efficacy of the cleaning and 
disinfection  
Pert (0.80-0.90-1)  Foddai et al., 2014  
Probability surviving in 
rubber (boots) 
Pert (0.886-0.75-0.536) Stevens et al., 2011 
Probability surviving in 
galvanized metal  
Pert (0.002-0.004-0.039) Stevens et al., 2011 
Probability surviving in soil  Pert (0.007-0.014-0.12) Stevens et al., 2011 
Probability of transmission 
from TI4 animal 
Uniform (0.001-0.05) Very low-DAFF, 2004  
Probability of transmission 
from PI1 animal  
Fixed value (0.66) Niskanen and Lindberg, 2003  
Bovine Herpesvirus-1 
Herd prevalence in France  Uniform (0.098-0.11) Gache 2014, GDS 2016 
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Herd prevalence in the 
Netherlands  
Uniform (0.15-0.156) Scopaff 2018, 
www.gdanimalhealth.com/monito
ringsurveillance  
Herd prevalence in Spain  Uniform (0.50-0.70) Raaperi et al., 2014 
Herd prevalence in Catalonia  Uniform (0.27-0.57)  Benavides et al., 2018 
Herd prevalence in Galicia  Uniform (0.06-0.11) Benavides et al., 2018 
Infected animal (<24 
months) 
Uniform (0.15-0.20) Santman Berends et al., 2018 
Infected animal (>24 
months) 
Uniform (0.53-0.58) Santman Berends et al., 2018 
Sensitivity of ELISA (Abs)  Uniform (0.72-0.927) Raaperi et al., 2014 
Specificity of ELISA (Abs)  Uniform (0.92-1) Raaperi et al., 2014 
Efficacy of the cleaning and 
disinfection  
Uniform (0.95-1) Nandi et al., 2009 
Probability of transmission 
from AI5 animal  
Pert (0.1-0.15-0.2) Mars et al., 2000 
Probability of reactivation of 
LI6 animal 
Fixed value (0.07) Noordegraaf et al.,1998 
Animal transport 
Visited farms in each 
country/area 
Uniform (2-4) Expert opinion 
Loaded animals in each farm  Uniform (9-18) Expert opinion 
Loaded animals in own-farm 
share vehicles 
Fixed value (4) Expert opinion 
Probability of cleaning/disinfection of the transport vehicle 
France  Uniform (0.4-0.6) Expert opinion 
The Netherlands Uniform (0.9-0.95) Expert opinion 
Catalonia, Galicia, and other 
parts of Spain 
Uniform (0.05-0.1) Expert opinion 
Table 1: Input parameters, distribution, and values to estimate the probability of introduction to Bovine 
viral diarrhea virus (BVDV) and bovine herpesvirus 1 (BoHV-1) in study farms. *On average half the PI1 
animals die before 1 year of age. 1PI=persistently infected; 2Abs=antibodies; 3Ag=antigen; 4TI= transiently 
infected; 5AI= acutely infected; 6LI=latently infected. 
 
The expected numbers of BVDV and BoHV-1 animals already infected in the farm of 
origin were calculated based on the probability that a single animal was infected using 
equations [3.1] and [3.2] (Appendix Table A2). The expected number of non-infected 
animals for each age group was therefore obtained by subtracting the expected number of 
animals infected in each age group from the total number of purchased animals. 
Probability of false negatives  
Based on group discussion with attending veterinarians, animals were routinely tested for 
the detection of BoHV1 and BVDV antibodies by using an ELISA prior to cattle 
purchase. Using ELISA, positive antibody was considered useful for detection of TI, TR 
or BoHV-1 seropositive cattle, but not PI. For the sensitivity (Se) and specificity (Sp) of 
the ELISAs, values reported by Hanon et al., (2018) and Raaperi et al., (2014) were used 
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for the detection of BVDV and BoHV-1 antibodies, respectively. For the detection of PI 
antigen, the values for the ELISA antigen as reported by Mars and Van Maanen, (2005) 
was used (Table 1). The probability that one infected animal yielded a false negative result 
was calculated based on equation [4] (Appendix Table A2). Therefore, the probability 
that at least one infected animal was present in the batch of animals, and the probability 
that at least one infected animal was purchased from at least one of the farms from which 
animals could be introduced was calculated using equations [5.1] and [5.2] (Appendix 
Table A2). 
Probability of infection during transport from an infected animal 
Non-infected cattle could be infected during transport by sharing the transport vehicle 
either with a PI (for BVDV) or AI (for BoHV-1) animal, or because of being transported 
in a contaminated vehicle. TI animals were not included because the probability of 
transmission from a TI is very low (Table 1). The likelihood of contact with other cattle 
during the transport was obtained from the biosecurity questionnaires. Unfortunately, data 
about the number of farms attended by the same vehicle per day in the country/area of 
origin, nor the average number of animals transported in each movement were not 
available. Thus, based on group discussion with attending veterinarians, the maximum 
capacity of the vehicle was 36 animals, and a number of farms visited in each country/area 
of origin ranging between two and four was considered. Therefore, the number of animals 
loaded by farm would be between 18 (in the case of two origins), or nine (in the case of 
four origins). To calculate the probability of sharing a transport vehicle with a PI or AI 
animal when purchasing animals from a country/area equations [6.1] and [6.2] were used 
(Appendix Table A2). 
We assumed that if purchased animals shared the same transport vehicle with PI or AI 
animals, the probability of infection was 100%, similar to a model reported by Santman-
Berends et al., (2017). In the case of BVDV, the infection during transport would yield a 
TI animal, except for pregnant animals between 30 and 120 days of gestation. In this case, 
the infection during transport could yield a TR cow.  
The probability that at least one non-infected (healthy) purchased animal of some age 
group yielded an infection status due to sharing transport vehicle with a PI or AI animal 
from each country/area was estimated with equation [7] (Appendix Table A2). In the case 
of BoHV-1, we considered animals greater or less than 24 months would have the same 
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probability of being infected; thus, the age group calculation was not included. An active 
infection of 1% of the BoHV-1 seropositive animals was assumed based on Santman-
Berends et al. (2018). Finally, the probability of being infected by considering the number 
of farms from which animals could be introduced was calculated. 
Probability of infection due to being transported in a contaminated vehicle 
The probability that at least one non-infected animal was infected due to being transported 
in a vehicle coming from some country and develop an infectious status was calculated 
using equation [8] (Appendix Table A2). In this equation the following parameters were 
included: i) the probability of cleaning and disinfecting the vehicle between transports, 
obtained in the group discussion with the field veterinarians, by the opinion of personnel 
working in the official veterinary services, and from the biosecurity questionnaires; ii) 
the efficacy of the cleaning and disinfection for BVDV as reported by Foddai et al. (2014) 
and for BoHV-1 based on descriptions reported by Nandi et al. (2009); iii) BVDV survival 
on different surfaces reported by Stevens et al. (2011) (Appendix Table A3). It was 
assumed that the time interval between transports had a minimum time of 4 hours, a most 
probable value of 12 hours, and a maximum of 24 hours. These values were justified 
based on input from the veterinarians involved in the study. The BoHV-1 survival was 
not included in the calculation because it was considered that it can survive during whole 
duration of the transport. Finally, the probability of infection of a susceptible animal in a 
contaminated surface was based on results from Niskanen and Lindberg (2003), who 
conducted an experiment in which three animals entered a pen where a PI had been 
previously, and two were infected. For BoHV-1, a value of daily aerogenic transmission 
of 0.15 between an infectious animal and another susceptible at a distance of 4 meters, as 
reported by Mars et al. (2000) was used as a proxy of indirect transmission.  
The probability of purchasing at least one PI, TI, TR, or BoHV-1 seropositive animal was 
calculated by summing the probability of purchasing infected animals at origin and the 
probability of infection during transport. 
Risk mitigation based on biosecurity measures implemented in the farm 
Prior to estimating the probability reduction arising from the implementation of 
biosecurity measures in the farm, the probability that one animal from the purchased batch 
was a PI, TI, TR or BoHV-1 seropositive animal was estimated, taking into account the 
total number of animals of each age group introduced using a similar approach to that in 
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the equation [3.1] (Appendix Table A2). The following biosecurity measures were 
considered in the model: 
Quarantine period. TI animals would be infectious for up to 18 days (Santman-
Berends et al., 2017), and would take between two and four days to become infectious 
(Muylkens et al., 2007). Thus, a duration of more than 24 days would reduce the 
probability of introduction to a negligible value. For PI, TR, and BoHV-1 seropositive 
cattle we did not considered the quarantine period. In addition in case the quarantine had 
a duration of less than 24 days, the probability of indirect transmission was estimated 
proportional to the duration (i.e., shorter durations would have a higher risk than longer 
ones). If tests were used in the quarantine, the probability that an animal yielded a false 
negative result was calculated using a similar equation to [4] (Appendix Table A2). 
Quarantine routines. If farmers or farm workers were not taking care of 
quarantined animals at the end of the working day, the possibility of indirect transmission 
by fomites (i.e., boots) due to movement of farm workers was also considered. The impact 
of this measure was estimated by multiplying the probability that the TI or PI animal 
yielded a false negative result with the survival probability of BVDV in rubber (i.e., 
boots) and the probability of indirect transmission (Table 1). The time interval between 
visiting the quarantine and the rest of the farm was about two hours (with a minimum of 
1 hour and a maximum of 4 hours) according to field veterinarian opinion. 
As a proxy for the probability of indirect transmission, the value reported in the 
experiment conducted by Niskanen and Lindberg (2003) for BVDV, and the one 
conducted by Mars et al. (2000) for BoHV-1 was used. In the case of TI animals, 
considering that they intermittently eliminate a low amount of virus (Lindberg and Houe, 
2005; Sarrazin et al., 2014b), the probability of transmission should be very low (Table 
1). A quantitative estimate for this probability was obtained following the semi-
quantitative methodology for import risk analysis described in the Department of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF, 2004). In the case of BoHV-1, a proportion 
of the seropositive animals that could excrete the virus during quarantine due to the stress 
of transportation was considered. According to Noordegraaf et al. (1998), 7% of the 
seropositive cows could be reactivated and excrete the virus after the transport. 
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Number of purchased cattle  
Finally, the annual probability of infection with BVDV or BoHV-1 due to purchasing 
animals was calculated by taken into account the number of animals introduced in each 
batch and the number of times animals were introduced in a 12-month period from each 
country/area. Therefore, the annual probability of BVDV or BoHV-1 infection in each 
study farm due to purchasing animals was calculated following equation [9] (Appendix 
Table A2). 
Movements to cattle competitions 
Some study farms moved cattle to national or regional competitions. To participate in 
these competitions, it is compulsory to certify that animals have tested negative for 
BoHV-1 antibodies and BVDV antigen. Therefore, for BVDV, the probability that false 
negative PI or TI animals could attend the competition would be negligible (as the 
sensitivity antigen detection tests is close to 100%). Thus, it was decided to only include 
this scenario in the pathway for BoHV-1.  
From the movement database, the number of movements to cattle competitions and the 
age of moved animals was extracted. Herd prevalence was assumed that of regions where 
the study farm was located (i.e., Galicia or Catalonia). Movement to competitions was 
assumed to be carried out by using external vehicles (from a company) based on 
discussion with the field veterinarians. For BVDV and BoHV-1, a similar approach to 
equation [8] (Appendix Table A2) was used to calculate the probability that animals 
transported to a competition were infected in a contaminated transport vehicle. In this 
case, animals in a transport vehicle could have one or two origins, and the maximum 
number of individuals loaded per farm was considered to be four. 
For BoHV-1, the probability that the animals shared the same vehicle with false negative 
AI animals or had direct or indirect contact with false negative AI animals at competition 
was also calculated using a similar approach to equation [7] (Appendix Table A2). 
Animals returning from the competition could enter directly into the farm or be 
quarantined. These data were obtained from the biosecurity questionnaires to calculate 
the probability of BVDV and BoHV-1 infection after implementation of biosecurity 
measures as previously described. 
Reared replacement heifers offsite  
Some study farms bred their own replacements offsite from the milking/lactating cattle 
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farm. The number of these movements and age of moved animals were obtained from the 
movements’ database; calculations were performed using a similar approach to equation 
[8] (Appendix Table A2). When the movement was carried out using an own vehicle, it 
was considered that transport could be shared with only one other farm, loading a 
maximum of four heifers. Risk mitigation derived from the quarantine was calculated as 
previously described. If heifers were reared in a multi-origin farm, these movements were 
considered as if they were from a different origin. Therefore, calculations described in 
the pathway for the introduction of reared replacement heifers’ offsite were performed 
using similar approach to equation [9] (Appendix Table A2). 
3.3.4. Sensitivity analysis 
A sensitivity analysis was performed to evaluate the influence of uncertainty of input 
parameters in the model output for all study farms. The Spearman correlation coefficient 
was selected for these calculations. In addition, in all farms three uncertain input 
parameters were tested. The first parameter evaluated was herd prevalence and prevalence 
of infected animals, and the second parameter was the number of visited farms in each 
country/area and loaded animals in each farm. Both parameters were reduced to half of 
those used as default. The third parameter was the probability of cleaning and disinfection 
of the transport vehicle with a range of 90% to 95%, being higher than default value. 
3.3.5. Risk mitigating strategies  
The impact of some biosecurity measures on the probability of BVDV and BoHV-1 
introduction was evaluated in selected farm as follows:  
Quarantine 
The quarantine fulfills following conditions: testing cattle on arrival, duration period is at 
least 24 days and, the quarantine is visited at the end of the workday. For BoHV-1 it was 
also considered a higher value for sensitivity and specificity of ELISA antibodies equal 
to 98.41% and 99.76 %, respectively (Bertolloti et al., 2015).  
Test in origin 
All purchased animals are tested prior to entering the farm. As previously described, 
higher sensitivity values were assumed for BoHV-1 ELISA.  
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Transport 
Transport vehicle is not shared with animals from another farm. 
 
3.4. Results 
3.4.1. Animal movements and biosecurity measures 
Among 127 study farms, 46 farms that moved cattle during 2017 were included in the 
risk assessment model. A description of cattle movements (number of entrances, number 
of purchased cattle, origin, age, other factors) by study farms is shown in Table 2.  
Origin of 
purchased 
animals 
 
Number 
of Farms* 
 
Min Median Max Total 
 Number of cattle introduced/purchased per farm 
France 11 1 1 14 29 
The Netherlands 6 1 1 2 6 
Catalonia 12 1 3 16 65 
Galicia 15 1 2 6 44 
Rest of Spain 4 1 3 15 22 
  Number of origins per group of cattle purchased  
France 11 1 3 10 42 
The Netherlands 6 1 1 1 5 
Catalonia 12 1 2 24 44 
Galicia 15 1 1 3 24 
Rest of Spain 4 1 1 3 6 
  Total number of animals purchased   
France 11 1 8 541 687 
The Netherlands 6 1 9 42 90 
Catalonia 12 1 14 169 418 
Galicia 15 2 4 40 108 
Rest of Spain 4 2 8 96 113 
Age of the animals (months)   
<12 15 2 6 7 113 
12 to 24 22 1 2 81 325 
>24 39 1 6 537 978 
Movements of reared replacement heifers offsite   
Number  15 1 11 28 176 
Heifers moved  14 134 357 1962 
Movements to competitions     
Number  8 1 2 2 13 
Cattle moved  1 2 6 27 
Table 2: Description of animal movements in study farms. *Some farms purchased cattle more than one 
location. Thus, the sum of farms is higher than the number of study farms (n=46). 
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Cattle transport was carried out mainly with vehicles by an external company, and 
several farms shared transport vehicles with cattle from other farms (Table 3).  
Table 3: Characteristics of transport vehicles used for animal movements in study farms. * Number of 
farms that shared transport vehicle with cattle from other farms. 
Of the 36 farms that purchased animals, 50% and 39% tested the animals for BVDV 
and BoHV-1 at the origin farm, respectively, prior to transportation. Eight out of 36 
farms had quarantine facilities, and five of them tested animals in the quarantine for 
both diseases. Among the eight farms with quarantine facilities, six visit the quarantine 
at the end of the workday, and in seven farms, the quarantine duration period was more 
than 24 days. Among farms with cattle returning from competitions, only one farm 
placed animals in quarantine facilities. Of movements made with farm-owned 
transports, five (55%) cleaned and disinfected vehicles after being used. 
3.4.2. Probability of BVDV and BoHV-1 introduction through 
animal movements at farm level 
The model calculated the probability of virus introduction for each farm according to their 
characteristics. As an example, model results from one selected farm, together with the 
number of movements and biosecurity measures of that farm, are shown in Figure 2 and 
Table 4. 
Type of movement 
Number of farms that use 
own transport vehicle 
Number of farms that use 
vehicles from external 
company 
Purchase of cattle 2 (0) * 34 (20) * 
Reared replacement heifers offsite 9 (1) * 6 (5) * 
Cattle competitions 0 8 (8) * 
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Figure 2: Probability distribution of Bovine Viral Diarrhea (BVD) and Infectious Bovine Rhinotracheitis 
(IBR) introduction for each movement performed by selected farm. a) Model results for BVD; b) Model 
results for IBR; c) Number and type of movements. T: Total probability. Probability of introduction through 
Co: cattle competitions; R: reared replacement heifers offsite; S: purchase of cattle from Spain; G: purchase 
of cattle from Galicia; C: purchase of cattle from Catalonia; N: purchase of cattle from The Netherlands; 
F: purchase of cattle from France. Movements: number of cattle movements from F: France; N: The 
Netherlands; C: Catalonia; G: Galicia; S: movements from Spain; R: replacement movements, and Co: 
movements to competitions. 
 
The selected farm (table 4) purchased cattle from Catalonia and other regions of Spain, 
attended cattle competitions, and reared replacement heifers offsite. All movements 
corresponded to non-pregnant cattle.  
 
 
 
Age (months) of 
animals* 
 <12    12-24    >24 
Origins Movements 
Test in 
origin 
Vehicle ST1  Q2 
Catalonia 0 1 0 1 1 No 
External 
company 
Yes No 
Other regions 
of Spain 
0 0 2 1 1 No 
External 
company 
Yes No 
Competitions 0 0 7 Na3 2 Yes 
External 
company 
Yes No 
External 
replacement 
71 0 0 1 12 No 
Own-
farmed 
   
No† 
 
No 
Table 4: Analyzed variables for one randomly selected farm. * All introduced/purchased cattle were non-
pregnant animals †The vehicle was not cleaned and disinfected after animals were unloaded; 1ST=Shared 
transport; 2Q=Quarantine; 3Na=Not apply. 
 
a b 
c 
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The risk assessment model estimated that the farm had a high annual probability of 
introduction of BVDV and BoHV-1, with median values of 75% and 62%, respectively. 
The purchase of cattle from other regions of Spain was the route with higher probability 
values for both diseases, while movements to cattle competitions, reared heifers offsite, 
and purchase of cattle from other farms of Catalonia were higher for BVDV only. Based 
on model results, the farm had a negligible probability of purchasing PI or TR animals 
(Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3: Probability of Bovine Viral Diarrhea introduction in a selected farm due to movements of animals 
within Catalonia, rest of Spain, replacement heifers and competitions. TR: Probability of Trojan cow 
introduction; TI: Probability of transiently infected cattle introduction; PI: Probability of persistently 
infected cattle introduction. 
 
As shown in Table 4, different biosecurity measures could be implemented to reduce the 
probability of introducing BVDV or BoHV-1 infected animals into the selected farm. The 
purchase of new animals was conducted without any testing prior to movement and, more 
importantly, they were transported in a shared transport vehicle with cattle from other 
farms and loaded into the farm without being quarantined. Reared replacement heifers 
offsite had no contact with other animals. However, transportation took place with an 
own-farm vehicle that was used for other farms’ movements, without cleaning and 
disinfection after each transportation. 
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3.4.3. Probability of BVDV and BoHV-1 introduction in the 46 
dairy farms analyzed 
Figure 4 shows the distribution of median probability values for the 46 study farms. The 
annual probability of introducing BVDV or BoHV-1 infected animals was very 
heterogeneous, being close to zero in some farms, while close to one in others (Figures 
4a and 4d). In twenty-three farms, the median probability of BVDV introduction was ≤ 
12%, (first quartile = 1.2%; third quartile = 28%). The median probability of BoHV-1 
introduction was lower than 9% (first quartile = 3%; third quartile = 23%). Farms that 
purchased cattle from their same region (i.e. local movements) had a higher probability 
for introduction of BVDV and BoHV-1, followed by farms that introduced animals from 
other regions of Europe, reared replacement heifers offsite, or showed cattle in 
competitions (Figures 4a and 4d). 
Sharing transport vehicles with other farms was the cause of a higher probability of 
infection for most study farms, followed by transport of animals in contaminated vehicles. 
The contribution of purchasing animals infected at origin was low for most study farms 
in the case of BVD, but not of IBR (Figures 4c and 4e). As regards BVDV infection 
status, in most of the farms the highest probability was the introduction of TI animals 
(Figure 4b). 
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Figure 4: Distribution of median probability values of Bovine Viral Diarrhea (BVD) and infectious bovine 
rhinotracheitis (IBR) introduction of all study farms. Figures 4a, 4b and 4c Probability of BVD introduction 
by Compet: cattle competitions; Repl: reared replacement heifers offsite; NoLoc: France, Spain and the 
Netherlands movements; Local: Catalonia and Galicia movements; Total: total probability by animal 
movements; TR: Trojan cows; TI: transiently infected cattle; PI: persistently infected cattle; CT: transport 
of cattle in contaminated vehicles; ST: share of transport vehicles with other farms, and Or: animal infected 
in origin. Figures 4d and 4e Probability of IBR introduction by Compet: cattle competitions; Repl: reared 
replacement heifers offsite; NoLoc: France, Spain and the Netherlands movements; Local: Catalonia and 
Galicia movements; Total: overall probability by animal movements; CT: transport of cattle in 
contaminated vehicles; ST: share of transport vehicles with other farms, and Or: animal infected in origin. 
 
3.4.4. Sensitivity analysis 
The Spearman correlation coefficient was close to zero in all farms for different input 
parameters (i.e., range -0.04 to 0.03). Therefore, the analysis showed that uncertainty in 
input parameters did not have any influence in model results. However, model results 
were sensitive to alterations in number of visited farms, number of loaded animals, herd 
prevalence, prevalence of infected animals and probability of cleaning/ disinfection of 
a b 
a 
c 
d e 
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animal transport vehicle. Figure 5, shows the distribution of median probability values 
for the 46 study farms to alternative values to those parameters. Prevalence of infected 
herds and infected animals were the parameters that had a higher influence in model 
results.  
 
Figure 5: Distribution of median probability values of all study farms of Bovine Viral Diarrhea Virus 
(BVD_S) and Infectious Bovine Rhinotracheitis (IBR_S) introduction with alternative values. I: Initial 
probability of introduction with default values; Prev: Lower herd prevalence and infected animals 
prevalence (i.e., half of default values);Trans: Lower number of farms visited in each country/area and 
lower number of animals loaded in each farm (i.e., half of default values); C-D: Higher probability of 
cleaning/disinfection of transport vehicle (i.e., range of 90 – 95%). 
 
3.4.5. Risk mitigating strategies 
When selected farm met expectations described for quarantine, there was a notable 
reduction in the probability of introducing BVDV and BoHV-1 (<15%). Not sharing 
transport with cattle from other farms had a great influence in the probability of BVDV 
and BoHV-1 introduction, as decreased to 30% and 45%, respectively. On the other hand, 
the impact of testing all purchased animals at origin had a low impact in the probability 
of disease introduction for BVDV. Figure 6 shows the effect of these risk mitigating 
strategies. 
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Figure 6: Reduction in probability of Bovine Viral Diarrhea Virus (BVD_R) and Infectious Bovine 
Rhinotracheitis (IBR_R) introduction by implementation of biosecurity measures in selected farm. I: Initial 
probability of introduction with default values; Q: Quarantine; Q + Se: Quarantine and higher sensitivity 
of antibodies ELISA; T: Test in origin; T + Se: Test in origin using antibodies ELISA with higher 
sensitivity; NS: Animal transport vehicle not shared with other farms. 
 
 
3.5. Discussion 
The risk assessment model showed that several farms had a high annual probability of 
introduction of BVDV and BoHV-1. Farms that purchased cattle from their same region 
(i.e. local movements) and shared transport with other farms had the higher probability 
for BVDV and BoHV-1 introduction. Results evidenced that biosecurity practices should 
be improved in dairy farms from Spain.  
Quantitative risk assessment models can provide an accurate estimate of the probability 
of virus introduction, as they take into account those factors that influence the likelihood 
of disease transmission, such as the survival of the virus in the environment, amount of 
pathogen excreted, frequency of contacts and, biosecurity measures and other factors that 
can modify the probability of transmission for a given contact. Consequently, these kinds 
of models have a higher degree of complexity and need quantitative data that are not 
always available. Therefore, most of developed models that measure level of biosecurity 
at farm level in cattle and other species, have been based only on opinions and 
perceptions, and do not provide an estimate of probability of disease introduction (Pinto 
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and Urcelay, 2003; Holtkamp et al., 2013; Laanen et al., 2013; Allepuz et al., 2018). Such 
models can be very useful as educational tools, for developing skills in risk-based 
prioritization, and increase awareness (Sternberg-Lewerin et al., 2015), as well as to 
benchmark farms in relation to their biosecurity level (Dewulf and van Immerseel, 2018). 
However, they cannot be used to assess probability of virus introduction, or to identify 
measures that should be prioritized based on their impact on that probability.  
The use of quantitative risk assessment models can be useful to promote the improvement 
of biosecurity in dairy cattle farms and support disease control programs. However, 
complexity and lack of understanding of logic behind development of quantitative risk 
analysis models by end-users (e.g., field veterinarians) hampers use of these models in 
practice, and therefore limits impact in improving biosecurity and/or supporting disease 
control programs. We tried to overcome this issue by using a participative approach with 
the objective of developing a risk assessment tool that could be adapted to end-user needs. 
With that purpose, we invited field veterinarians to identify input parameters of the model, 
obtain some data (e.g., data related with animal transport practices), and evaluate the 
reliability of the obtained results. A successful implementation of biosecurity programs 
requires the participation of farmers, industry, and veterinarians (Barkema et al., 2015), 
so further efforts to discuss model results and, if needed, to incorporate suggested 
modifications with these stakeholders would be of paramount importance to improve 
biosecurity.  
A parameter with a high degree of uncertainty was BVDV and BoHV-1 herd prevalence 
in Spain. We combined reported data in several epidemiological studies in order to 
consider differences between places with or without voluntary control programs for both 
diseases. Currently, in Spain, BVDV and BoHV-1 control programs are voluntary, and 
only implemented in some regions. As a matter of fact, in Galicia (north-western Spain) 
there is a voluntary program for both diseases (Lindberg et al., 2006; Eiras et al., 2009). 
However, since September 2019 a voluntary control program for BoHV-1 has been 
created in Spain (Royal Decree 554/2019). Due to the lack of recent studies about herd 
prevalence in the different regions of Spain, this parameter ranged between 26% and 71%. 
Consequently, the probability of virus introduction through this route also had a very wide 
distribution. Reducing uncertainty on the herd prevalence of BVDV and BoHV-1 infected 
herds would also be beneficial for increasing the accuracy of the model results.  
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In relation to cattle transport, we only had information on moved animals, but no specific 
information about routines of the cattle transport vehicle (e.g., number of farms visited 
per day, number of animals by transport vehicle, etc.). Lack of availability of this data is 
also common in other countries in Europe, as reported previously in other studies 
(Bronsvoort et al., 2008; Santman-Berends et al., 2018). Consequently, in this study the 
information was obtained through the discussions held with attending veterinarians. The 
sensitivity analysis evidenced that variation on these parameters influenced model results. 
Therefore, incorporation of data from animal transport companies in the risk assessment 
model would increase the accuracy of the estimations.  
Interestingly, model results highlighted the important role of the animal transport vehicles 
in the spread of these viruses between dairy cattle farms, especially in the case of local 
movements when purchasing replacement heifers. In addition, testing animals in origin 
did not have a great influence in reducing the probability of disease introduction, as shown 
in the analysis conducted in one selected far. This lack of efficiency was also related to 
the role of animal transport, as negative animals in origin could get infected during 
transport. On the one hand, as a voluntary control program for both diseases, there are no 
legal requirements to transport cattle in relation to their health status. On the other hand, 
the cleaning and disinfection of transport vehicles is compulsory, but the efficacy is 
probably low, and sometimes these are not applied. Efforts on the development of more 
adequate disinfection points within Spain and with more rigorous monitoring, would be 
beneficial to reduce the probability of disease transmission through contaminated 
vehicles, as demonstrated previous studies that include international transport 
(Bronsvoort et al., 2008; Fountain et al., 2018). Furthermore, animal transports in which 
cattle from different farms were mixed, was quite common and increased the probability 
of disease introduction in several farms. The low number of animals moved by some 
farms hampers the possibility of not mixing due to economic reasons. A discussion should 
be set up in order to evaluate how this practice could be reduced, without compromising 
the viability of transport companies.  
In the model, we assumed that all animals that shared transport vehicle together with a PI 
animal or AI animal, got infected. This represents a worst-case situation, because the 
limited duration of transport does not necessarily result in all cattle being infected by the 
PI or the AI animal. On the one hand, efficient transmission of BVDV from acutely 
infected animals may require exposure to higher viral loads or for a longer period of time 
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(Falkenberg et al., 2018). On the other hand, in BoHV-1 infections, latently infected 
animals can reactivate due to transportation stress, posing a similar risk compared to AI 
animals. In addition, periods of time less than eight hours are rather short to become both 
infected and then progress to the subsequent infectious status (Santman-Berends et al., 
2018). In the model, we assumed the duration of animal transport was not enough for 
reactivation and we only considered it during the quarantine.  
Participation in competitions did not represent a significant probability of disease 
introduction for most of the farms attending them, similar to that found in Denmark for 
the case of participation in international competitions (Foddai et al., 2014). The exception 
could be in relation to BVDV in the case of sending pregnant cattle of between 30 and 
120 days of gestation to these competitions. Therefore, the probability of introducing TR 
cattle due to movements to cattle competitions could be avoided by just not sending 
pregnant cattle to participate. On the other hand, some researchers have found that 
allowing cattle to return to farm after competitions is a risk factor for the introduction of 
BoHV-1 and BVDV (Van Wuijckhuise et al., 1998; Houe, 1999). For BoHV-1, gathering 
of large numbers of cattle is a stress factor that could result in virus reactivation, and the 
overcrowded barn would facilitate spread of infectious diseases. Moreover, cattle 
returning to farm of origin could infect other cattle on farm (Van Schaik et al., 1999). 
Nevertheless, compulsory testing of all animals attending cattle competitions reduced the 
probability of disease introduction by this route, again the vehicle for animal transport 
being the most critical point to be infected.  
This study had some limitations. First, the participation of farms was voluntary, so our 
sample was not representative of the dairy farms in Spain. However, in this study we 
intended to develop a risk assessment model to improve biosecurity rather than providing 
an estimate of the probability of disease introduction in dairy farms from these areas. 
Second, only one experimental study (Niskanen and Lindberg 2003) was available for the 
probability of indirect transmission of BVDV (i.e., infection due to contact with 
contaminated surfaces). In addition, to our knowledge, there are no studies for BoHV-1 
about the probability of indirect transmission and survival of virus in different materials. 
BoHV-1 is stable for 1 month at 4°C, can be inactivated at 37°C within 10 days, and at 
22°C within 50 days, and may survive for more than 30 days in foodstuffs (Nandi et al., 
2009). Thus, based on reported resistance in the environment, we assumed that the virus 
would survive time between movements. In the same way, we did not find data on 
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efficacy of cleaning and disinfection for BoHV-1 and based on the virus characteristics 
described by Straub (1990) we assumed that efficacy of conventional disinfectants was 
high. Further studies analyzing how these viruses are transmitted would be beneficial in 
order to develop more accurate models. 
In the studied farms, the probability of introducing BVDV and BoHV-1 could be reduced 
by the implementation of biosecurity measures. We believe that, despite the inherent 
limitations of the developed model, we have provided a useful tool that supports the 
decision making on which biosecurity measures should be prioritized in dairy cattle herds 
in order to reduce the probability of introduction of these viruses. In addition, further 
efforts should be made to estimate the probability of virus introduction through other 
routes, such as movement of people, non-animal transport, etc., in order to obtain a 
complete scenario for each farm.  
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4.1. Abstract 
A stochastic quantitative risk assessment model was developed to estimate the annual 
probability of the introduction of bovine viral diarrhea virus (BVDV) and bovine 
herpesvirus 1 (BoHV-1) on 127 dairy farms through indirect contacts. Vehicles 
transporting calves, cattle to slaughterhouse, dead animals, and mixture of feed, as well 
as visits by veterinarians and hoof trimmers, farm workers and contacts with neighbors 
were considered in the model. Data from biosecurity questionnaires of each farm, 
scientific literature and expert opinion from field veterinarians, animal vehicle drivers, 
hoof trimmers and personnel from rendering transport companies were used to estimate 
values for input parameters. Results showed that the annual probability of introducing 
BVDV or BoHV-1 through indirect contacts was very heterogeneous, with median 
values for each farm ranging from 0.5 to 14.6% and from 1.0% to 24.9% for BVDV and 
BoHV-1, respectively. The calf vehicles and visits by veterinarians were the routes with 
higher probability of infection. The model also identified that providing protective 
clothing and boots exclusively for the farm, not allowing the animal vehicle driver to 
come into contact with animals present on the farm and ensuring that the calf vehicles 
arrived empty, were the measures with the highest impact on the probability of infection 
for most farms. This model might be a useful tool to show the effect of biosecurity 
measures to the farmers and veterinarians, and to support decision making on the 
measures that should be prioritized in dairy cattle herds to reduce the probability of 
introduction of diseases. 
4.2. Introduction 
Bovine viral diarrhea virus (BVDV) and Bovine herpesvirus-1 (BoHV-1) infections are 
endemic, and cause disease in cattle populations worldwide. Both BVDV and BoHV-1 
are transmitted horizontally by direct contact and contaminated fomites (e.g., pathogens 
carried on clothes, equipment or vehicles visiting the farm) (Muylkens et al., 2007; 
Nöremark et al., 2013). Cattle movements are considered as the major cause of BVDV 
and BoHV-1 spread between-farms (Van Schaik et al., 1998; Lanyon et al., 2014). 
However, they can also be spread due to sharing of contaminated equipment, movement 
of vehicles, farm workers, and visitors (Van Schaik et al., 1998; Gunn, 1993; Niskanen 
and Lindberg, 2003).  
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Although indirect contacts are less efficient in transmitting infectious diseases compared 
to direct contacts (Bates et al., 2001), indirect contacts can occur more frequently (Rossi 
et al., 2017a). The role of indirect transmission is still largely unknown due to limited 
availability of data, the highly diverse and complex nature of indirect contacts, and for 
privacy reasons. It is much easier to track livestock movements than that of farm 
operators, visitors, or vehicles (Rossi et al., 2017a). Existing studies highlight the 
importance of visitors who come in close contact with livestock in disease transmission 
(i.e., veterinarians, artificial insemination technicians, milk trucks, transporters of 
livestock, and rendering trucks) (Bates et al., 2001; Rossi et al., 2017b). Employees who 
work on other farms and/or kept cattle of their own represent a risk for BoHV-1 
transmission (Van Schaik et al., 2001; Bates et al., 2001), as well as those making social 
visits who have contact with areas where cattle can have access, also represent a risk for 
disease spread (Nielen et al., 1996). Exchanging or sharing equipment between farms 
(e.g., tractors) is another type of indirect contact that has been described in dairy farms 
(Brennan et al., 2008). Bates et al., (2001) in United States quantified with a range from 
234 to 743, the number of indirect contacts/month between farms (i.e., number of contacts 
in farm by individuals and vehicles that visited multiple livestock facilities). While in the 
Netherlands the mean indirect contact rate was 91 (Nielen et al., 1996), in New Zealand 
was 50 (Sanson et al., 1993). These different studies showed that the number of contacts 
between farms varies greatly when considering factors such as type of enterprise and 
facilities, or number of animals on the farm. Finally, epidemiological analysis such as 
network analysis and Susceptible-Infectious-Susceptible (SIS) spread models have 
supported disease spread at local scale (Rossi et al., 2017a, 2017b). 
Biosecurity measures might be effective in reducing disease transmission through indirect 
contacts between farms. Recommendations described in the literature include avoiding 
equipment sharing, or promoting equipment disinfection in case it is shared, positioning 
of vehicle bath systems, providing personal protective equipment and boots, and 
restricting visitor contact with animals (Morley, 2002; Van Schaik et al., 2002; Mee et 
al., 2012). Animal transport vehicles should arrive empty, clean, and disinfected before 
entering the farm. If cattle from other farms are present on the vehicle, it should not enter 
and the driver should not be allowed to come into contact with animals on the farm 
(Sarrazin et al., 2018).  
  Study II  
89 
Quantitative risk assessment at farm level is a useful tool that enables biosecurity 
measures to be prioritized in order to reduce the likelihood of disease transmission 
between farms. The aim of this study was to quantify the probability of BVDV and 
BoHV-1 virus introduction into dairy farms through indirect contacts, and to identify and 
prioritize the measures that should be implemented or improved. 
 
4.3. Materials and Methods 
4.3.1. Risk release pathways 
Indirect transmission pathways and their parameters included in the model were justified 
in consultation with two discussion groups of ten field veterinarians (one group in Galicia 
and the other one in Catalonia, Northwestern and Northeastern Spain, respectively) 
(Annex B. Table A1). The model considered the following pathways: i) animal transport 
vehicles (i.e., slaughterhouse and calf transport vehicles); ii) other vehicles (i.e., rendering 
and feed); and iii) visitors (i.e., veterinarians, hoof trimmers, farm workers shared 
between farms and visits or shared material between neighboring farms).  
4.3.2. Data 
Biosecurity data, together with BVDV and BoHV-1 prevalence data from 127 dairy farms 
(34 in Catalonia and 93 in Galicia) were obtained from a previous study conducted in the 
area (Benavides et al., 2018). Data for other parameters were obtained from peer-review 
papers, the above-mentioned discussion groups with field veterinarians and by telephone 
interviews with animal vehicle drivers, hoof trimmers and personnel from rendering 
transport companies. Parameters included in the model and their distributions are 
summarized in Table 1. 
Parameter  Distribution  References  
BVDV 
Herd prevalence in Catalonia  Uniform (0.54, 0.57)  Benavides et al., 2018  
Herd prevalence in Galicia  Uniform (0.03, 0.16) Benavides et al., 2018 
PI1 prevalence (<12 months) Pert (0.0022, 0.0024, 
0.0026) 
Galician diagnostic 
laboratory, (data from 
2018)  
PI prevalence (12 to 24 months) * Pert (0.0011, 0.0012, 
0.0013) 
Galician diagnostic 
laboratory, (data from 
2018) 
Efficacy of cleaning and disinfection  Pert (0.80, 0.90, 1)  Foddai et al., 2014  
Quantitative risk assessment through indirect contacts  
 
90 
Probability surviving on galvanized metal 
(1-2 hours) 
Uniform (0.096, 0.22) Stevens et al., 2011 
Probability surviving on soil (8-12-24 
hours) 
Pert (0.056, 0.104, 
0.13) 
Stevens et al., 2011 
Probability of BVDV indirect 
transmission  
Fixed Value (0.1) Viet et al., 2004  
Proportion of farms from Catalonia 
without PI control  
Pert (0.37, 0.53, 0.68) Benavides et al., 2018 
Proportion of farms from Galicia without 
PI control 
Pert (0.19, 0.27, 0.37) Benavides et al., 2018 
Proportion of tested animals in farms with 
a PI control program 
Fixed value (0.5) Expert opinion 
BoHV-1 
Herd prevalence in Catalonia  Uniform (0.27, 0.57)  Benavides et al., 2018  
Herd prevalence in Galicia  Uniform (0.06, 0.11) Benavides et al., 2018 
Infected animals (<24 months) Uniform (0.15, 0.20) Santman Berends et al., 
2018 
Infected animals (>24 months) Uniform (0.53, 0.58) Santman Berends et al., 
2018 
Probability of acute infection in infected 
animals  
Fixed value (0.01) Santman Berends et al., 
2018 
Efficacy of cleaning and disinfection  Uniform (0.95, 1) Nandi et al., 2009 
Probability of BoHV-1 indirect 
transmission 
Pert (0.09, 0.10, 0.13) Vonk Noordegraaf et 
al., 2002 
Slaughterhouse transport vehicle  
Number of farms visited in Catalonia and 
Galicia** 
Pert (2, 3, 5) Expert opinion 
Animals loaded in each farm from 
Catalonia  
Pert (7, 8, 10) Expert opinion 
Animals loaded in each farm from Galicia Pert (3, 7, 10) Expert opinion 
Calf transport vehicle   
Probability of cleaning/disinfection  Pert (0.21, 0.29, 0.38) Benavides et al., 2018 
Number of farms visited in Catalonia**  Pert (7, 10, 15) Expert opinion 
Number of farms visited in Galicia** Pert (5, 10, 20) Expert opinion 
Number of animals loaded in Catalonia  Pert (25, 30, 35) Expert opinion 
Number of animals loaded in Galicia  Pert (10, 20, 50) Expert opinion 
Rendering vehicle   
Number of bovine farms visited**  Pert (6, 10, 12) Expert opinion 
Number of dead cattle loaded per farm  Pert (2, 4, 7) Expert opinion 
Mortality rate of PI calves (First year) Fixed value (0.5) Ezanno et al., 2007 
Mortality rate of calves due to BoHV-1 Fixed value (0.02) Moeller et al., 2013  
Mortality rate of heifers due to BoHV-1 Fixed value (0.084) Walker et al., 2012 
Probability of transmission given the 
vehicle  
do not enter inside the farm perimeter  
Uniform (0, 
0.000001) 
Negligible-DAFF, 2004 
Feed vehicle    
Number of visited farms**  Pert (4, 6, 8) Expert opinion 
Visitors    
Probability of cleaning and disinfection of 
veterinary material 
Pert (0.78, 0.86, 0.91) Renault et al., 2017 
Probability of sharing material between 
farms 
Fixed value (0.2) Expert opinion  
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Probability of BVDV surviving on 
enameled metal and rubber (20 minutes-
1-2 hours) 
Pert (0.75, 0.88, 1) Stevens et al., 2011 
Proportion of farms providing protective 
clothing and boots  
Pert (0.043, 0.078, 
0.138) 
Benavides et al., 2018 
Number of farms visited by any 
veterinarian in Catalonia**  
Uniform (1, 5) Expert opinion 
Number of farms visited by clinical 
veterinarians in Galicia**  
Uniform (4, 10) Expert opinion 
Number of farms visited by rest of 
veterinarians in Galicia** 
Uniform (4, 6) Expert opinion 
Probability of cleaning and disinfection of 
hoof trimmers material 
Uniform (0.9, 0.95) Expert opinion 
Number of farms visited by hoof trimmers 
in Catalonia** 
Pert (3, 4, 5) Expert opinion 
Number of farms visited by hoof trimmers 
in Galicia** 
Pert (4, 5, 10) Expert opinion 
Number of annual visits by hoof trimmers 
in farms with ≤250 animals 
Number of annual visits by hoof trimmers 
in farms with ≤600 animals 
Number of annual visits by hoof trimmers 
in farms with >600 animals 
Fixed value (4) 
 
Fixed value (12) 
 
Fixed value (24) 
Expert opinion  
 
Expert opinion 
 
Expert opinion 
Probability of farm worker was 
contaminated given did not  
share boots between farms  
Uniform (10-6, 0.001) Extremely low-DAFF, 
2004 
Number of days worked by farms workers Fixed value (250) https://www.dias-
laborables.es 
Neighbors    
Number of annual visits by neighbors  Fixed value (50) Expert opinion  
Number of annual times that farms>100 
cattle share material  
Fixed value (12) Expert opinion 
Number of neighboring farms from which 
visits can be received 
Maximum fixed 
value (3) 
Expert opinion  
Table1: Input parameters to estimate the probability of bovine viral diarrhea virus (BVDV) and bovine 
herpesvirus 1 (BoHV-1) introduction by indirect contacts in the study farms 
 
4.3.3. Model development 
To estimate the probability of introduction of BVDV and BoHV-1 into the 127 study 
farms in a 12-month period, we developed a stochastic risk assessment model by using 
the mc2d package (Pouillot and Delignette-Muller, 2010) implemented in R 
(https://www.R-project.org/). Monte Carlo simulations (10,000 iterations) were 
performed, and all non-fixed input parameters were included as uncertain parameters. 
Probability of infection due animal transport vehicles 
Animal transport vehicle pathway is shown in Figure 1. Based on interviews with vehicle 
drivers, calves for fattening and culled cows for slaughterhouse were not mixed in the 
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same transport. Therefore, although a vehicle could be the same, we estimated the 
probability of infection in vehicles picking-up dairy cattle for slaughterhouse separately 
from those used for calves. Further, some farmers reported in the biosecurity 
questionnaire that calves were transported in owned farm vehicle. Thus, for such vehicles 
both options (i.e., external company and own farm) were considered, whereas for 
slaughterhouse vehicles, it was assumed an external company provided transportation. 
 
 
Figure 1: Pathway of entrance through animal transport vehicles 
For BVDV, we only considered the likelihood of transporting persistently infected 
animals (PI), since transiently infected animals (TI) are not highly contagious (Lindberg 
and Houe, 2005). In Spain, according to field veterinarians, most farms with a PI control 
program only test females (i.e., replacement animals that will stay in the farm) and 
positive animals are slaughtered on the farm. Therefore, PI animals could be loaded on 
animal transport vehicles if they are males, or if they are females from an infected farm 
without a PI control program. In slaughterhouse vehicles, we assumed that PI animals 
were >12 months, as younger animals are more likely sent to fattening using calf vehicles. 
The estimated proportion of PI animals was that in PI calves detected in all calf births 
during 2018 in on farms from Northwestern Spain, involved in BVDV control program. 
For BoHV-1, we used the prevalence of infected animals <24 months old for calf vehicle 
and >24 months old for the slaughterhouse vehicle, and seropositive animals with an acute 
infection (AI) was assumed at 1% according to reported by Santman-Berends et al. 
(2018). Finally, the probability of loading at least one BVDV or BoHV-1 infected animal 
on calf vehicles (PC1) or slaughterhouse vehicles (PS1) was calculated using equation 
[1] in Table 2.  
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In farms where the animal transport vehicle always arrived empty (i.e., without animals), 
the probability that calf vehicles (PC2) or slaughterhouse vehicles (PS2) were 
contaminated on arrival was estimated using equation [2] in Table 2. We assumed that all 
the slaughterhouse vehicles were clean and disinfected when departing from a 
slaughterhouse, as it is compulsory by law, and facilities for cleaning and disinfection are 
in place in all of them. For calf vehicles, the proportion of farms in which a vehicle arrived 
clean and disinfected was obtained from biosecurity data. In addition, based on interviews 
with vehicle drivers, a time interval between 1 and 2 hours from departure to arrival at 
the farm was considered. BVDV survival on a metal surface was included for this time 
interval based on Stevens et al., (2011), and for BoHV-1 it was assumed that the virus 
would also survive 1 or 2 hours (Nandi et al., 2009). Finally, if animal transport vehicles 
belonged to an external company, the probability that at least one infected animal was 
loaded on the farm was estimated taking into account the number of farms each type of 
vehicle can visit in one day (Equation [3] in Table 2). And for the own-farm calf vehicles 
it was consider that, if shared, it was shared with a single farm.  
We assumed that BVDV or BoHV-1 could enter the farm through the vehicle driver and 
thus, the probability that the driver was contaminated was equal to values estimated for 
vehicles in equation [2] in Table 2. The probability that they were contaminated during 
each day was estimated taking into account the number of farms visited every day using 
equation [3] in Table 2. According to biosecurity data, animal transport vehicles entered 
within the perimeter in all the studied farms. Therefore, the only biosecurity measure that 
could reduce the probability of infection was for the vehicle driver to avoid contact with 
cattle present at the farm (i.e., those that were not loaded on the vehicle transport).  
The probabilities of indirect transmission (PT) for BVDV reported by Viet et al., (2004) 
and BoHV-1 Vonk Noordegraaf et al. (2002) were considered to estimate the probability 
of transmission given a contact between contaminated driver and cattle from the farm. If 
the driver did not have any contact with animals present at the farm, we assumed that 
organic matter of the driver’s boots could be a source of contamination on the farm 
through farm workers. In this case, we considered the probability of indirect transmission 
in two steps. The annual probability that the driver a calf vehicle (PC4) and the 
slaughterhouse vehicle (PS4) could infect the farm was calculated using equation [4] in 
Table 2. 
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Probability of infection due other vehicles 
Other vehicles included rendering transport vehicle and feed vehicle (i.e., vehicle that 
provides the mixture of food) (Figure 2). For the rendering transport vehicle, we 
considered the likelihood that the driver would become contaminated by contact with a 
dead animal infected with BVDV (i.e., only PI animal) or BoHV-1 from a random farm 
while loading it inside the vehicle. For BVDV, the probability that the vehicle driver had 
contact with a dead PI animal was influenced by the existence of PI control programs. 
For farms without a PI control program, we considered that half of the PI animals would 
die during the first year of life (Ezanno et al., 2007). If the farm did have a PI control 
program, we considered that half of the PI calves could be found in the dead animals 
collecting point as these animals were slaughtered at the farm. For BoHV-1, we used 
mortality rates described in calves and heifers by Moeller et al. (2013) and Walker et al. 
(2012), respectively. To estimate the likelihood that the vehicle driver from the rendering 
vehicle was contaminated due to a contact with a PI or a BoHV-1 dead animal, PT was 
used. Feed vehicles providing the mixture of food to several farms was used in some of 
them (according biosecurity data), and their drivers did not have direct contact with the 
cattle of the farm. Therefore, to estimate the probability that drivers from these vehicles 
became infected when visiting a random infected farm, we assumed that two consecutive 
steps should occur: i) a farm worker becomes contaminated by stepping on a 
contaminated area at the farm and ii) the driver was contaminated when passing through 
a farm worker stepping area. Thus, we used the PT squared.  
 
Figure 2: Pathway of entrance through rendering vehicles and feed vehicles 
If the time interval between farms was less than 1 hour for both vehicles the virus would 
survive. Therefore, the probability that a driver from a rendering vehicle (PR1) or a driver 
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from a feed vehicle (PF1) was contaminated either by BVDV or BoHV-1 was estimated 
using equation [5] in Table 2. The probability that the driver of a rendering vehicle or a 
feed vehicle was contaminated each day was estimated taking into account the number of 
farms visited every day using equation [6] in Table 2. If a rendering vehicle did not enter 
inside the perimeter of the farm to pick-up dead animals, the probability of infection was 
considered negligible. And finally, the probability that the farm became infected due to 
the rendering vehicle (PR3) or the feed vehicle (PF3) was estimated using the equation 
[7] in Table 2.  
 
Probability of infection due to visitors 
Veterinarians, hoof trimmers, farm workers that work in other cattle farms or have cattle 
at home and neighbors (i.e., cattle farms within a radius of 1 kilometer of each farm) were 
considered in the visitors pathway (Figure 3). Sharing pastures among neighboring farms 
was excluded because in the Spanish context it is an uncommon practice on dairy farms. 
In addition, according to field veterinarians, visitors from neighboring farms are frequent 
in small farms (i.e., <100 animals) for handling animals or help in birth, but very rare in 
larger farms. Therefore, for farms with <100 cattle we considered the likelihood of 
transmission from neighbor’s visits while in larger farms we considered the probability 
of transmission due to sharing material with neighbors (data obtained from biosecurity 
data). Neighbors (for small farms) or shared material (for larger farms) were both 
calculated in the same way (PN1). Veterinarians (PV1), farm workers (PW1) and 
neighbors (PN1) could have had contact with cattle of any age while for hoof trimmers 
(PH1) it was assumed that they only would have had contact with animals >24 months 
old. Then, the probability that visitors had contact with at least with one infected animal 
when visiting a random farm was calculated using equation [8] in Table 2.  
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Figure 3: Pathway of entrance through visitors 
In the next step, we considered the likelihood that their boots or reusable material (e.g., 
material for C-sections) were contaminated when leaving the farm. For farm workers, 
we only considered the likelihood of contamination of the boots, as it was assumed that 
they would not share reusable material between farms. For hoof trimmers, we assumed 
that they always shared material between farm visits. The proportion of farms providing 
boots to their visitors was obtained from biosecurity data, and the proportion of times a 
veterinarian used reusable material when visiting a farm was estimated as 20% by 
interviewed field veterinarians. The probability that veterinarians cleaned and 
disinfected the reusable material before going to the next farm was obtained from 
Renault et al. (2017); in hoof trimmers this probability was obtained through interviews 
with them. Thus, the probability that veterinarians and hoof trimmers reusable material 
(i.e., PV2 and PH2, respectively) was contaminated when leaving from a random farm 
was estimated using equation [9] in Table 2. Similarly, the probability of contaminated 
boots from veterinarians, farm workers and hoof trimmers (i.e., PV3, PW2 and PH3, 
respectively) was estimated using equation [10] in Table 2. 
Considering the time interval between visited farms by veterinarians and hoof trimmers 
(i.e., between 20 minutes and 2 hours), reported by field veterinarians, BVDV survival 
in rubber and enameled metal (Stevens et al., 2011) was included to estimate the 
probability that veterinarians (PV4) and hoof trimmers (PH4) arrived contaminated at 
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the next farm using equation [11] in Table 2. In Northwestern Spain, based on group 
discussions with field veterinarians, the number of farms visited by clinical veterinarians 
every day was higher (80%) than for the other veterinarians (20%). We assumed farm 
workers could only work on a second farm and, therefore, they could just visit one 
additional farm the same day. Then, the probability that an attending veterinarian or 
hoof trimmer became contaminated each day was estimated taking into account the 
number of farms visited by them every day, using equation [12] in Table 2. For 
neighbors, regardless the number of neighbors, it was assumed that visitors (or material) 
would come from a maximum of three farms and we estimated the probability (PN2) 
using equation [13] in Table 2. 
The only biosecurity measure included in this pathway was the provision of protective 
clothing and boots to visitors. When this measure was applied, the probability that an 
attending veterinarian or hoof trimmer was a source of contamination on arrival would 
be attributable to reusable material. In farm workers that did not use same boots in 
multiple farms, the probability of contamination was considered to be extremely low. 
For neighbors visits this measure was not considered, because based on group discussion 
with field veterinarians, it was assumed that they would not use boots from the visited 
farm even if the farm had this biosecurity measure implemented for general visitors.  
For the annual frequency of visitors that could have had direct contact with animals 
(reported in biosecurity data), we assumed that half of the visits corresponded to 
veterinarians. For farm workers, it was assumed they worked on the farm 250 days per 
year (annual business days). For neighbors, the frequency of visitors was set at 50 times 
per year while for shared material it was set at 12 times per year (PN3). In addition, for 
hoof trimers, the number of visits depended on the number of animals on the farm (Table 
1) according to the interviews with hoof trimmers. The annual probability of infection 
due to veterinarians (PV6), farms workers (PW3), hoof trimmers (PH6) and neighbors 
(PN3) was estimated using equation [14] in Table 2. 
Finally, the probability that the farm could become infected in one year by indirect 
contacts (PIND) was estimated using equation [15] in table 2. 
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 Equation  Description  
Animal transport vehicles   
1.Probability of loading at least one BVDV or BoHV-1 infected animal in the calf (PC1) or slaughterhouse 
vehicle (PS1)  
 
𝑃𝐶1 (𝑗, 𝑘) = 1 − (1 − 𝐻𝑃(𝑗, 𝑘) ∗  [(𝑃𝑃𝐼 ∗ 𝐶𝑃𝐼 + 𝑃𝑃𝐼 ∗ (1 − 𝐶𝑃𝐼) ∗ 𝐵)  𝑜𝑟 𝑃𝐼𝐵𝑅(𝑗) ∗ 𝐴𝑐𝐼])^𝑛(𝑗) 
𝑃𝑆1 (𝑗, 𝑘) = 1 − (1 − 𝐻𝑃(𝑗, 𝑘) ∗ ([𝑃𝑃𝐼2 ∗ 𝐶𝑃𝐼 𝑜𝑟 𝑃𝐼𝐵𝑅2(𝑗) ∗ 𝐴𝑐𝐼])^𝑛(𝑗) 
 
 
• j: subscript for the region (Catalonia or 
Galicia) 
• k: subscript for the virus (BVDV or BoHV-
1) 
• HP: herd prevalence 
• PPI: prevalence of PI animals <12 months 
• CPI: proportion of farms without a PI 
control program 
• B: proportion of cattle tested in farms with 
a PI control program (i.e., 50%) 
• PIBR: proportion of seropositive BoHV-1 
animals <24 months 
• AcI: probability of having an acute 
infection 
• n: number of animals loaded on each farm 
• PPI2: prevalence of PI animals >12 
months 
• PIBR2: proportion of seropositive BoHV-
1 animals >24 months 
 
2. Probability that calf vehicle (PC2) or slaughterhouse vehicle (PS2) was contaminated on arrival  
 
𝑃𝐶2  (𝑗, 𝑘) = 𝑃𝐶1 (𝑗, 𝑘) ∗  (1 − 𝑃𝐶𝐷) ∗ 𝑠𝑚 +  𝑃𝐶1(𝑗, 𝑘) ∗ 𝑃𝐶𝐷 ∗ (1 − 𝐸𝐶𝐷) ∗ 𝑠𝑚   
 
𝑃𝑆2  (𝑗, 𝑘) = 𝑃𝑆1 (𝑗, 𝑘) ∗  (1 − 𝐸𝐶𝐷) ∗ 𝑠𝑚   
 
 
• PCD: probability of cleaning and 
disinfection  
• ECD: efficacy of cleaning and 
disinfection  
• sm: BVDV survival in galvanized metal 
(1-2 hours) 
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3. Probability that at least one infected animal was loaded in the calf vehicle (PC3) or the slaughterhouse 
vehicle (PS3) according to the number of farms that each vehicle of external company can visit in one day 
 
𝑃𝐶3(𝑗, 𝑘) = 1 − (1 − 𝑃𝐶2 (𝑗, 𝑘))
𝑛(𝑖)
 
 
𝑃𝑆3(𝑗, 𝑘) = 1 − (1 − 𝑃𝑆2 (𝑗, 𝑘))
𝑛(𝑖)
 
 
 
4.Annual probability that the driver of the calf vehicle (PC4) or slaughterhouse vehicle (PS4) could infect 
the farm 
 
𝑃𝐶4(𝑖, 𝑘) = 1 − (1 − [𝑃𝐶3(𝑗, 𝑘) 𝑜𝑟 𝑃𝐶3(𝑗, 𝑘) ∗ 𝑃𝑇𝐼𝐶 𝑜𝑟 𝑃𝑇𝐼𝐶^2 ])^(𝐴𝐹(𝑖)) 
 
𝑃𝑆4(𝑖, 𝑘) = 1 − (1 − [𝑃𝑆3(𝑗, 𝑘) 𝑜𝑟 𝑃𝑆3(𝑗, 𝑘) ∗ 𝑃𝑇𝐼𝐶 𝑜𝑟 𝑃𝑇𝐼𝐶^2 ])^(𝐴𝐹(𝑖)) 
 
• n: number of farms visited per day 
• i: subscript for each farm 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• PTIC: probability of transmission given 
an indirect contact 
• AF: number of times the vehicle arrived at 
each farm in one year  
Other vehicles   
5.Probability that the driver from a rendering vehicle (PR1) or a feed vehicle (PF1) was contaminated 
either by BVDV or BoHV-1 
 
𝑃𝑅1(𝑗, 𝑘) = 1 − (1 − 𝐻𝑃(𝑗, 𝑘) ∗ ([𝑃𝑃𝐼 ∗ 𝐶𝑃𝐼(𝑗) 𝑜𝑟 𝑃𝐼𝐵𝑅(𝑗) ∗ 𝐴𝑐𝐼] ∗ 𝑀𝐶(𝑘) ∗ 𝑃𝑇𝐼𝐶(𝑘)
+  [𝑃𝑃𝐼 ∗ (1 − 𝐶𝑃𝐼(𝑗)) ∗ 𝐵 𝑜𝑟 𝑃𝐼𝐵𝑅2(𝑗) ∗ 𝐴𝑐𝐼 ∗ 𝑀𝐻] ∗ 𝑃𝑇𝐼𝐶(𝑘)) )
𝑛𝑑(𝑖)
 
 
𝑃𝐹1 (𝑗, 𝑘) = 1 − (1 − 𝐻𝑃 (𝑗, 𝑘) ∗ [𝑃𝑃𝐼 𝑜𝑟 𝑃𝐼𝐵𝑅(𝑗)] ∗ 𝑃𝑇𝐼𝐶^2) 
 
 
• MC: mortality rate in calves 
• MH: BoHV-1 mortality rate in heifers 
• nd: number of dead cattle loaded per farm 
6. Probability that the driver of rendering vehicle or the feed vehicle was contaminated each day according 
the number of farms visited every day 
 
𝑃𝑅2(𝑗, 𝑘) = 1 − (1 − 𝑃𝑅1 (𝑗, 𝑘))
𝑛(𝑖)
 
 
 
 
 
 
Quantitative risk assessment through indirect contacts  
 
100 
 
𝑃𝐹2(𝑗, 𝑘) = 1 − (1 − 𝑃𝐹1 (𝑗, 𝑘))
𝑛(𝑖)
 
 
7.Probability that the farm become infected due to the rendering vehicle (PR3) or the feed vehicle (PF3) 
 
𝑃𝑅3(𝑖, 𝑘) = 1 − (1 − 𝑃𝐶𝐴2 (𝑗, 𝑘) ∗ [𝑃𝑇𝐼𝐶 𝑜𝑟 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑙])^(𝐴𝐹(𝑖)) 
 
𝑃𝐹3(𝑖, 𝑘) = 1 − (1 − 𝑃𝐹2 (𝑗, 𝑘) ∗ 𝑃𝑇𝐼𝐶)^(𝐴𝐹(𝑖)) 
 
 
 
 
 
• Negl: probability of transmission if the 
rendering vehicle did not enter inside the 
perimeter of the farm 
Visitors  
8. Probability that visitors contacted at least with one infected animal when visiting a random farm, 
veterinarians (PV1), farm workers (PW1), hoof trimmers (PH1), and neighbors (PN1) 
 
𝑃𝑉1 (𝑗, 𝑘) = 1 − (1 − 𝐻𝑃 (𝑗, 𝑘) ∗ [𝑃𝑃𝐼 𝑜𝑟 𝑃𝐼𝐵𝑅(𝑗) ∗ 𝐴𝑐𝐼]) ∗ (1 − 𝐻𝑃 (𝑗, 𝑘) ∗ [𝑃𝑃𝐼2 𝑜𝑟 𝑃𝐼𝐵𝑅2(𝑗) ∗ 𝐴𝑐𝐼]) ) 
 
𝑃𝑊1 (𝑗, 𝑘) = 1 − (1 − 𝐻𝑃 (𝑗, 𝑘) ∗ [𝑃𝑃𝐼 𝑜𝑟 𝑃𝐼𝐵𝑅(𝑗) ∗ 𝐴𝑐𝐼]) ∗ (1 − 𝐻𝑃 (𝑗, 𝑘) ∗ [𝑃𝑃𝐼2 𝑜𝑟 𝑃𝐼𝐵𝑅2(𝑗) ∗ 𝐴𝑐𝐼])  ) 
 
𝑃𝐻1 (𝑗, 𝑘) = 1 − (1 − 𝐻𝑃 (𝑗, 𝑘) ∗ [𝑃𝑃𝐼2 𝑜𝑟 𝑃𝐼𝐵𝑅2(𝑘) ∗ 𝐴𝑐𝐼]) 
 
𝑃𝑁1 (𝑗, 𝑘) = 1 − (1 − 𝐻𝑃 (𝑗, 𝑘) ∗ [𝑃𝑃𝐼 𝑜𝑟 𝑃𝐼𝐵𝑅(𝑗) ∗ 𝐴𝑐𝐼]) ∗ (1 − 𝐻𝑃 (𝑗, 𝑘) ∗ [𝑃𝑃𝐼2 𝑜𝑟 𝑃𝐼𝐵𝑅2(𝑗) ∗ 𝐴𝑐𝐼])  ) 
 
 
9. Probability that reusable material of veterinarians and hoof trimmers were contaminated when leaving 
from a random farm  
 
𝑃𝑉2 (𝑗, 𝑘) =   0.2 ∗ ( 𝑃𝑉1 (𝑗, 𝑘) ∗ 𝑃𝐿𝐷 ∗ (1 − 𝐸𝐶𝐷 ) +  𝑃𝑉1(𝑗, 𝑘) ∗ (1 − 𝑃𝐿𝐷)) 
𝑃𝐻2 (𝑗, 𝑘) = 𝑃𝐻1 (𝑗, 𝑘) ∗ 𝑃𝐿𝐷 ∗ (1 − 𝐸𝐶𝐷 ) +  𝑃𝐻1(𝑗, 𝑘) ∗ (1 − 𝑃𝐿𝐷) 
 
10. Probability that boots of veterinarians, hoof trimmers and farm workers were contaminated when 
leaving from a random farm 
 
𝑃𝑉3 (𝑗, 𝑘) = 𝑃𝑉1(𝑗, 𝑘) ∗ (1 − 𝑃𝐵) 
• PLD: probability of cleaning and 
disinfecting reusable material either by 
veterinarian or hoof trimmer 
 
 
 
 
• PB: proportion of farms providing boots 
and protective clothing to their visitors 
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𝑃𝑊2 (𝑗, 𝑘) = 𝑃𝑊1(𝑗, 𝑘) ∗ (1 − 𝑃𝐵) 
 
𝑃𝐻3 (𝑗, 𝑘) =  𝑃𝐻1(𝑗, 𝑘) ∗ (1 − 𝑃𝐵) 
 
11. Probability that the veterinarian and the hoof trimmer arrive contaminated at the next farm  
 
𝑃𝑉4 (𝑗, 𝑘) = 1 − (1 − 𝑃𝑉2(𝑗, 𝑘) ∗ 𝑠𝑟𝑚) ∗ (1 − 𝑃𝑉3 (𝑗, 𝑘) ∗ 𝑠𝑟𝑚) 
 
𝑃𝐻4 (𝑗, 𝑘) = 1 − (1 − 𝑃𝐻2(𝑗, 𝑘) ∗ 𝑠𝑟𝑚) ∗ (1 − 𝑃𝐻3 (𝑗, 𝑘) ∗ 𝑠𝑟𝑚) 
 
12. Probability that the veterinarian (PV5), hoof trimmer (PH5) became infected each day according the 
number of farms visited by them every day 
 
𝑃𝑉5(𝑗, 𝑘) = 1 − (0.8 ∗ (1 − 𝑃𝑉4 (𝑗, 𝑘))
𝑛(𝑗) 𝑜𝑟 𝑛𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑛(𝑗)
+ 0.2 ∗ (1 − 𝑃𝑉4 (𝑗, 𝑘))
𝑛(𝑗)∗𝑜𝑟 𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡(𝑖)
) 
 
𝑃𝐻5(𝑗, 𝑘) = 1 − (1 − 𝑃𝐻4 (𝑗, 𝑘))
𝑛(𝑗)
 
 
13. Probability that neighbors became infected each day according the number of farms visited by them 
every day 
 
𝑃𝑁2(𝑖, 𝑘) = 1 − (1 − 𝑃𝑁1 (𝑗, 𝑘))
𝑛𝑛(𝑗)
 
 
14. Annual probability of infection due to veterinarians (PV6), farms workers (PW3), hoof 
trimmers (PH5) and neighbors (PN3) 
 
𝑃𝑉6(𝑖, 𝑘) = 1 − (1 − 𝑃𝑉5 (𝑗, 𝑘)  ∗ 𝑃𝑇𝐼𝐶)𝐴𝐹𝑉(𝑖) 
 
𝑃𝑊3(𝑖, 𝑘) = 1 − (1 − 𝑃𝑊2 (𝑗, 𝑘)  ∗ 𝑃𝑇𝐼𝐶)𝐴𝐹𝑉(𝑖) 
 
𝑃𝐻6(𝑖, 𝑘) = 1 − (1 − 𝑃𝐻5 (𝑗, 𝑘) ∗ 𝑃𝑇𝐼𝐶)𝐴𝐹𝑉(𝑖) 
 
𝑃𝑁3(𝑖, 𝑘) = 1 − (1 − 𝑃𝑁2 (𝑗, 𝑘) ∗ 𝑃𝑇𝐼𝐶)𝐴𝐹𝑉/𝐴𝐹𝑀(𝑖) 
 
 
 
 
• srm: BVDV survival in rubber and 
enameled metal (20 min -2 hours) 
 
 
 
 
• nclin: number of farms visited by clinical 
veterinarians 
• nrest: number of farms visited by the rest 
of veterinarians 
 
 
 
 
• nn: number of neighboring farms   
 
 
 
 
• AFV: number of times that the 
veterinarians, farm workers, hoof 
trimmers or neighbors visited each farm in 
one year 
• AFM: number of times that material was 
shared between neighboring farms in one 
year  
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15. Probability that the farm could become infected in one year by indirect contacts (PIND) 
𝑃𝐼𝑁𝐷 (𝑖, 𝑘) = 1 − (1 − 𝑃𝐶4(𝑖, 𝑘)) ∗ (1 − 𝑃𝑆4(𝑖, 𝑘)) ∗ (1 − 𝑃𝑅3(𝑖, 𝑘)) ∗ (1 − 𝑃𝐹3(𝑖, 𝑘)) ∗  (1 − 𝑃𝑉6(𝑖, 𝑘)) ∗
(1 − 𝑃𝑊3 (𝑖, 𝑘) ∗ (1 − 𝑃𝐻6(𝑖, 𝑘))* (1- 𝑃𝑁3(𝑖, 𝑘)) 
 
• PC4: probability of infection due the calf 
vehicle  
• PS4: probability of infection due the 
slaughterhouse vehicle 
• PR3: probability of infection due the 
rendering vehicle 
• PF3: probability of infection due the feed 
vehicle 
• PV6: probability of infection due 
veterinarians 
• PW3: probability of infection due farms 
workers 
• PH6: probability of infection due hoof 
trimmers 
• PN3: probability of infection due 
neighbors 
Table 2: Equations used to estimate probabilities inside the model to evaluate the probability of BVDV and BoHV-1 introduction in a dairy farm
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4.3.4. Impact of biosecurity measures in the probability of BVDV 
and BoHV-1 introduction 
The impact of biosecurity measures (IBM) to reduce the probability of BVDV and 
BoHV-1 introduction through indirect contacts was evaluated by calculating the 
probability of infection if each measure (rm) was applied in all study farms (i) compared 
with the median of original results (or). In percentage terms we used the follow 
estimation: 
𝐼𝐵𝑀(𝑖) = 1 − (𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛(𝑟𝑚(𝑖))/ 𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛(𝑜𝑟(𝑖))) ∗ 100 
And the follows measures were included in this estimation:  
 Animal transport vehicles. Calf and slaughterhouse vehicles did not share 
transport with other cattle during the same trip (i.e., arrived empty at the farm), 
and vehicles drivers did not have contact with cattle present on the farm. 
 Rendering vehicle. The vehicle did not enter inside the farm perimeter to 
collect dead animals. 
 Protective clothing and boots. Each farm provided boots and protective 
clothing to all visitors who were expected have direct contact with animals. 
4.3.5. Sensitivity Analysis 
A sensitivity analysis was performed to evaluate the influence of uncertainty of input 
parameters in the model output for all study farms. Six uncertain input parameters were 
tested: i) the probability of BVDV and BoHV-1 indirect transmission; ii) the probability 
of clean and disinfected of material used by veterinarians and hoof trimmers; iii) number 
of visited farms by animal transport vehicles; iv) number of farms visited by 
veterinarians and hoof trimmers; v) the probability of sharing material during 
veterinarian visits; and vi) number of farms visited by feed vehicles and rendering 
vehicles. For the latter, the number of cadavers collected was also included. The six 
parameters listed above were reduced to half of the default value, and their effect in the 
model was evaluated independently. 
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4.4.  Results 
4.4.1. Characteristics and application of biosecurity measures in 
study farms 
The herd size of the 127 study farms ranged from 15 to 954 (median=110). The annual 
frequency of indirect contacts by each farm considered in the model ranged from 66 to 
712 (median=124). Rendering vehicles came once per month in most farms, while animal 
transport vehicles came mostly between one and two times per month. Veterinarians 
visited farms two to five times per month, and hoof trimmers made four visits per year. 
Most farms (n=124) used vehicles from an external company either to transport culled 
cattle to a slaughterhouse or calves for fattening and could arrive with cattle from other 
farms in 94.4% of slaughterhouse vehicles and 92.7% of calf vehicles. In addition, the 
driver could have had contact with animals present on the farm while helping to load 
cattle on the truck in 88.7% of slaughterhouse vehicles and 86.3% of calf vehicles. A 
rendering transport vehicle entered inside the farm perimeter in 80.4% of the study farms. 
Shared feed vehicles providing the mixture of food to the farm were used by 37.1% of 
the farms. Farm staff could also work in another bovine farm or had cows at home in 
10.2% of the studied farms. Finally, only 7.9% of the farms provided boots and protective 
clothing exclusively for the farm. 
4.4.2. Probability of BVDV and BoHV-1 introduction through 
indirect contacts in the 127 dairy farms analyzed 
Figure 4 shows the distribution of the probability of BVDV and BoHV-1 introduction 
through indirect contacts to each study farms, and Table 3 presents summary statistics of 
median probability values (in percent) of BVDV and BoHV-1 introduction through 
indirect contacts to each farm. The distribution of median values was very heterogeneous. 
Median values varied from 0.5 to 14.6% and from 1.0 to 24.9% for BVDV and BoHV-1, 
respectively. In most farms, the median value was higher for BoHV-1 (3.9%) than for 
BVDV (2.1%). In 75% of farms, the median value was below 3.5% and 6.8% for BVDV 
and BoHV-1, respectively. Calf vehicles and veterinarians visits were routes with a higher 
probability of infection. 
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Figure 4. Distribution of the probability of Bovine viral diarrhea virus (BVDV) and Bovine Herpesvirus I 
(BoHV-1) introduction through indirect contacts to each of the studied farms (n=127). 
    Bovine Viral Diarrhea Virus Bovine Herpesvirus I 
Pathway Route Min1 Q12 Median Q33 Max4 Min Q1 Median Q3 Max 
Animal 
transport  
Slaughterhouse 
vehicle  
6.0-6 2.6-4 2.8-4 8.3-4 
 
1.01 
 
9.4-6 0.35 0.37 1.05 7.72 
Calf vehicle  5.9-5 0.46 0.49 1.23 8.42 7.4-5 0.63 0.68 1.57 11.3 
 
Other 
vehicles 
Rendering 
vehicle  
5.0-6 7.0-0.5 8.0-0.5 9.0-0.5 0.51 1.7-6 2.8-3 3.0-3 3.2-3 2.70 
Feed vehicle  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.37 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.18 1.01 
Visitors 
Veterinarians 7.0-4 0.4 0.69 1.5 6.90 0.11 0.69 1.17 2.58 14.0 
Hoof trimmers  1.0-4 3.2-4 3.3-4 7.9-3 0.48 5.2-3 7.3-3 7.5-3 0.22 2.20 
Farm workers  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.50 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.78 
Neighbors 4.9-5 1.4-5 9.9-5 0.53 0.99 4.9-5 3.3-4 2.0-3 1.03 1.71 
Table 3: Summary statistics of the median probability values (in percent) of Bovine viral diarrhea virus 
and Bovine Herpesvirus I introduction through indirect contacts in the studied farms (n=127). 
4.4.3. Impact of biosecurity measures on the probability of 
BVDV and BoHV-1 introduction through indirect contacts in the 
127 dairy farms analyzed   
Figure 5 shows the percentage of reduction in the median probability of BVDV and 
BoHV-1 introduction for studied farms. In general, wearing boots and protective 
clothing exclusively for the farm (BO), and not allowing the driver of the animal vehicle 
to come into contact with animals present at the farm (DR), were the measures with a 
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higher impact on the probability of infection in most of the farms. And for BVDV, 
ensuring that the calf vehicles arrived empty to the farm (CE) also could reduce the 
probability of infection. While not allowing the rendering vehicle to enter inside the 
farm perimeter (REN) and ensuring that a slaughterhouse vehicle arrived empty to the 
farm (SLE) were the measures with a lower impact on both diseases.  
 
 
Figure 5: Percentage of reduction in the median probability of Bovine Viral Diarrhea Virus (BVDV_E) 
and Bovine herpesvirus-1 (BoHV-1_E) introduction after implementation of biosecurity measures in the 
studied farms (n=127). BO: farm provide boots and protective clothing to visitors; REN: rendering vehicle 
do not enter inside the farm perimeter; DR: drivers of animal transport vehicles do not come into contact 
with the animals present at the farm; CE: calf vehicle arrives empty; SLE: slaughterhouse vehicle arrives 
empty. 
 
4.4.4. Model results and impact of biosecurity measures on 
probability of BVDV and BoHV-1 introduction a selected farm 
The selected farm had a high probability of BVDV and BoHV1 introduction. The farm 
had about 150 cows in lactation, and replacement animals were reared at an external 
location. The animal transport vehicle was from an external company (for both the calf 
vehicle and the slaughterhouse vehicle) and could arrive with other cattle; the driver 
helped to loading animals on the truck and could have come into contact with cattle 
present at the farm. Calf and slaughterhouse vehicles arrived four and two times per 
month, respectively. The rendering vehicle visited the farm once per month but did not 
entered inside the perimeter. Veterinarians and hoof trimmers visited the farm four times 
per month and four times per year, respectively. The farm provided boots to visitors but 
not protective clothing. Farm staff included nine workers; one of them also worked at 
another farm, and this worker used the same boots on both farms. There five additional 
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cattle farms in the area (i.e., 1 km radius) which did not share equipment or supplies with 
the selected farm.   
The risk assessment model estimated that selected farm had an annual probability of 
BVDV and BoHV-1 introduction through indirect contacts of 14.6% (95%CI: 11.9%-
17.9%) and 24.9% (95CI: 16.7%-32.9%), respectively. Routes with highest probability 
of diseases introduction were i) the calf transport vehicle: 8.3% (95%CI: 6.6%-17.9%) 
and 11.2% (95%CI: 4.7%-17.8%), respectively; ii) farm workers: 4.5% (95%CI: 3.9%-
5.1%) and 7.7% (95%CI: 4.7%-11.1%), respectively; and iii) visits by veterinarians: 1.8% 
(95%CI: 0.1%-3.6%) and 4.2% (95%CI: 0.3%-8.1%), respectively. In this particular 
farm, the model evidenced that efforts should be devoted to avoid contact between the 
animal transport vehicle driver and cattle from the farm followed by the use of exclusive 
farm boots and protective clothing, as these measures had the highest impact on the 
probability of introduction (Figure 6). 
Figure 6: Probability of Bovine viral diarrhea virus (BVDV_E) and Bovine herpesvirus-1 (BoHV-1_E) 
introduction after implementation of biosecurity measures in selected farm. BO: farm provide protective 
clothing and boots to visitors; REN: rendering vehicle do not enter inside the farm perimeter; DR: drivers 
of animal transport vehicles do not come into contact with the animals present at the farm; CE: calf vehicle 
arrives empty; SLE: slaughterhouse vehicle arrives empty; I: initial median probability of BVDV and 
BoHV-1 introduction. 
4.4.5. Sensitivity analysis 
Figure 7 shows the proportion of change in median probability values of introduction to 
each of the studied farms, after changing values in selected parameters in the sensitivity 
analysis. The probability of transmission given an indirect contact (PT) was the most 
influential parameter in both diseases. When reducing PT value by half the probability of 
introduction decreased from of 21% to 71% for BVDV and 47% to 77% for BoHV-1. 
Changes in the number of visited farms by animal transport vehicles (VA) and the number 
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of farms visited by veterinarian and hoof trimmers (VIS) also had a great influence on 
model results. The influence of VA was higher for BVDV. Changes in the proportion of 
farms where veterinarians shared material (MAT), in the number of farms visited by feed 
or rendering vehicles (OV), or in the probability of cleaning and disinfection of reusable 
material between farms by veterinarians and hoof trimmers (LDVIS) did not have a great 
influence on model results. 
Figure 7: Proportion of change in the median probability values of Bovine Viral Diarrhea Virus (BVDV_S) 
and Bovine herpesvirus-1 (BoHV-1_S) introduction with alternative values (sensitivity analysis) in the 
studied farms (n=127). OV: number of farms visited by feed vehicle and rendering vehicle; MAT: 
proportion of farms with veterinarian material shared; VIS: number of farms visited by veterinarians and 
hoof trimmers; VA: number of visited farms by animal transport vehicles; PT: probability of BVDV and 
BoHV-1 indirect transmission; LDVIS: probability of clean and disinfection of material used by 
veterinarians and hoof trimmers. 
4.5.  Discussion  
The results of this study showed that indirect contacts such as on-farm visitors and shared 
animal transport vehicles between farms can increase the probability of BVDV and 
BoHV-1 introduction on dairy farms. Among visitors, veterinarians were identified as 
having a higher probability of introducing BVDV and BoHV-1 into dairy farms studied. 
On the one hand, veterinarians were the most frequent visitors, and in the case of 
clinicians they made consecutive visits to multiple farms on a given day. Therefore, their 
potential of transmission of disease from one farm to another could be higher than other 
visitors. On the other hand, the time between one visit and another according to the 
discussion groups was short (e.g., 10-20 minutes), which probably made it to apply the 
recommended biosecurity protocols for their vehicle, equipment, and for themselves (i.e., 
cleaning and disinfection of their boots and material). Several studies also identified the 
veterinarian as the visitor with the highest risk of disease transmission between farms, 
because they visit more frequently different farms on the same day and have direct contact 
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with the animals (Sibley, 2010; Nöremark et al., 2013; Rossi et al., 2017b) despite that 
they usually make the greatest biosecurity efforts among people visiting farms (Nöremark 
et al., 2010; Nöremark et al., 2013). For minimizing the probability of disease 
transmission by visitors, the use of boots and protective clothing is the best-known 
biosecurity measure, but unfortunately in the farms studied only ten provided them to 
visitors that were going to be in contact with animals. This result is in accordance with 
observations made in other countries. As an example, in Belgium, Sarrazin et al. (2014) 
reported that despite protective clothing and boots being present on several farms, they 
were infrequently used by visitors. Even farmers and farm workers carried out these 
hygienic measures with much lower frequency themselves. The risk assessment model 
developed in this study evidenced that implementing this biosecurity measure would have 
an important impact in reducing the probability of both viruses introduction through 
indirect contacts in most of the farms. Therefore, efforts should be made to raise 
awareness in visitors of the importance of using farm-specific protective clothing and 
boots when visiting it.  
This study also identified the risk of the animal transport vehicles to introduce BVDV 
and BoHV-1 when these vehicles were shared between farms or when the driver had 
contact with the animals present on the farm. Previous studies reported that farmers 
sharing animal transports with other farmers is a common practice (Nöremark, 2010), as 
well as the risk that assumed by animals from different farms transported separately but 
in successive shipments (Bigras-Poulin et al., 2007; Smith et al., 2013). Although, to 
ensure the adequate cleaning and disinfection of the transporters between pickups is 
recommended (Alexandersen et al., 2003; Dee 2004; Smith et al., 2013), one study in 
Switzerland found that only 44% of calf transports are cleaned after each use (Schnyder, 
2019), this proportion is similar to that found in this study. When evaluating biosecurity 
measures, the probability of introduction of both viruses is greatly reduced when the 
vehicle was not shared between farms (i.e., the vehicle arrived empty), because it reduces 
the risk of infected animals entering in the truck, and could contaminate the farm facilities 
or boots and clothing of drivers, especially for BVDV as PI animals shed large amounts 
of virus resulting in consistent and reliable transmission, even through contaminated 
objects (Niskanen and Lindberg, 2003). 
As regards the vehicle drivers, the main measure recommended in the literature is 
requiring them to remain on the vehicles and outside the collection point during the 
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loading process. Lowe et al. (2014) found this biosecurity measure may have a dramatic 
effect on limiting the transmission of infectious agents, and we obtained similar results in 
this study. The driver avoiding contact with cattle present in the farm had a high impact 
in reducing the probability of infection in several farms. Therefore, if 
cleaning/disinfection cannot be assured or cattle from other farms are present in the 
transport vehicle when visiting the farm, requiring the driver to remain in the vehicle 
would significantly reduce the probability of disease transmission.  
Despite that indirect contacts had a lower probability of BVDV and BoHV-1 transmission 
compared to direct ones (i.e., movements of animals), 12% for BVDV and 9% for BoHV-
1 (Benavides et al., 2020), 63% (81/127) of farms had no movements of animals in the 
study period, there was viral circulation, which shows the importance of indirect 
transmission routes for the viruses studied. Therefore, including direct and indirect 
transmission pathways allowed to have a complete picture about the different ways by 
which both viruses can be introduced into each farm, and quantifying the probability of 
disease transmission through direct and indirect contacts, allows prioritizing the 
implementation of biosecurity measures according to the current situation in each farm, 
since most farms just focus on those measures associated with the most apparent risks. 
For farms that moved animals, the most important measure was the correct application of 
quarantine, but in the farms that did not enter animals, it was a secondary measure, while 
the use of boots and personal protective clothing, together with animal transport drivers 
avoiding contact with cattle from the farm, were the most relevant measures. It is worth 
a mention that animal transport greatly influenced the probability of disease transmission 
in both models (i.e., direct and indirect contacts).  
There were limitations to this study. First, few studies have evaluated for how long BVDV 
and BoHV-1 can survive in fomites and farm environments to understand livestock 
infection dynamics (Evans et al., 2019), which mean that accurate estimates could not be 
made of the probability that they survived between visits. In addition, there is little 
information as regards contamination rates of personnel, vehicles, or equipment after 
visiting infected farms and there are very few estimates on the probability of transmission 
given an indirect contact. Second, the frequency of visits was based on farm registers and 
the characteristics of the last farm visited by the people arriving to the farm was not 
available (just the frequency of visits) so, it was assumed that visits came from a random 
farm of the population. Third, farms in the study and people interviewed (e.g., 
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transporters) were selected according to their willingness to participate. There might, 
therefore, be a classification bias in the estimations, as they might tend to answer what 
should be done and not what is done. Further studies to better characterize biosecurity 
practices among visitors (such as drivers) might be desirable to improve model accuracy. 
Despite the above-mentioned limitations, the model has the advantage in that it is flexible 
and biosecurity measures can be easily incorporated to study their effect in each particular 
case. Therefore, it might contribute to evaluate the effectiveness of the measures in each 
farm and to provide advice to farmers about the importance of biosecurity measures. It 
might also update veterinarians in biosecurity topics and infectious diseases, which could 
in turn improve acceptance and enforcement of biosecurity practices at farm level. 
 
4.6.  Conclusion 
The developed risk assessment tool enables prioritization based on the impact of farm-
specific biosecurity practices in the probability of BVD and BoHV-1 introduction on 
dairy cattle farms. This tool could help to develop structural, feasible and reasonable 
biosecurity protocols between farmers and veterinarians focusing on prevention under 
daily field practice conditions. Results in the studied farms from Spain provide evidence 
that efforts should be made to review biosecurity practices in relation to animal transport 
and visitors in most of the farms. Providing farm specific protective clothing and boots 
and avoiding animal transport drivers having contact with animals present in the farm 
would highly reduce the probability of infection through indirect contacts.   
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The importance of biosecurity is increasingly recognized due to the benefits related to 
animal health, increasing the profitability, and reducing the costs of diseases. A 
biosecurity program should be specific to each animal species or production system and 
it should differ for all farm operations because even within a group, risks vary by the type 
of management. The swine and poultry industries have implemented to a greater extent 
biosecurity programs with specific and detailed biosecurity guidelines. However, other 
production industries, such as sheep and cattle, have less explicit recommendations with 
fewer guides regarding biosecurity practices (Moore et al., 2008). The results shown in 
this doctoral thesis provide useful information for the development of biosecurity 
programs at the farm level according on-farm specific characteristics, that might 
contribute to maintaining a low risk of introduction of infectious diseases and that allows 
prioritizing the measures that should be applied in the daily routine. 
Livestock biosecurity and its implementation are complex. The application of biosecurity 
measures depends largely on the attitude and perception of risk (Casal et al., 2007; Gunn 
et al., 2008; Kristensen and Jakobsen, 2011). Despite awareness of biosecurity may exist, 
its implementation at farm level is often poor (Faust et al., 2001; Hoe and Ruegg, 2006; 
Brandt et al., 2008; Gunn et al., 2008; Mee et al., 2012), because farmers ignore the 
potential risks to their farms and/or they have a lack of understanding of the value of 
implementing recommendations (Moore et al., 2008). Some of the obstacles to the 
implementation or improvement of biosecurity at farm level are associated with 
knowledge about the mechanisms of disease transmission (Sayers et al., 2014; Pritchard 
et al., 2015) and efficacy of biosecurity measures (Gunn et al., 2008).  
Risk analysis (Murray et al., 2014), which has been applied mainly in the context of 
international trade to assess the risk of entry of pathogens into a country (for example, 
Santman-Berends et al., 2017) allows to estimate the risk of introduction and to evaluate 
the impact of control interventions. Therefore, it might be also a useful methodology to 
evaluate the efficacy of biosecurity measures on the probability of disease introduction in 
a farm, based on the mechanisms of disease transmission and farm specific 
characteristics. The quantification of the probability of infection for each farm based on 
its characteristics is the best starting point for decision-making, as allows prioritizing 
biosecurity measures according to risk which together with the availability of resources 
(financial, labor, and farm infrastructure) might motivate farmers and field veterinarians 
to implement an efficient biosecurity program (Wells et al., 2002; Mee et al., 2012). 
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Because of the strengths of risk analysis, we decided to follow this methodology in this 
doctoral thesis.  
Results obtained through this thesis showed that the probability of entry of a pathogen 
can be differentiated based on the characteristics of the farms and the transmission routes. 
In general, direct contacts through animal movements had a higher probability of 
infection than indirect contacts, which is in accordance to the importance of animal 
movements in disease spread (Van Schaik et al., 2002; Niskanen and Lindberg, 2003; 
Mee et al., 2012). However, most of the dairy herds included in the study, did not have 
introduced cattle in their farms, and were exposed only to indirect contacts. In several of 
these farms, BVDV and / or BoHV-1 circulation was found, suggesting the importance 
of indirect transmission pathways. On the other hand, it was found that there is an 
increased probability of infection during transport by direct contact between animals, by 
contamination of the vehicle, or by the presence of other animals in the vehicle, showing 
the importance to control all routes of transmission to prevent disease introduction to the 
farm. 
Biosecurity measures related to visitors in dairy farms, are not applied usually, such as 
the presence of perimeter fences, the registration of visitors or the use of protective 
clothing and boots, in comparison with intensive production system (Moore, et al., 2008; 
Nöremark et al., 2010). Despite that, most of the biosecurity measures which farmers 
perceive as important are related to the reduction of risks attributable to the entrance of 
people and vehicles that could act as carriers of infectious agents (Sarrazin et al., 2014). 
Casal et al., (2007), reported in pig farms that farmers considering important to restrict 
visits did not apply any basic measures to reduce them, this fact could indicate that some 
farmers may be aware that, as a concept, visits may imply a risk, but they do not see a 
visitor as a real risk. In dairy farms this could also happen, as there were very few farms 
that provided protective personal equipment to visitors, having this measure a high impact 
in reducing the probability of disease introduction through indirect contacts. The 
developed models might contribute to increase awareness to implement such biosecurity 
measures.  
According literature, vehicles such as rendering company vehicles should be considered 
as a biosecurity risk because disease transmission through excreta of cadavers, and 
indirectly via fomites contaminated by them (Falkenberg et al., 2018); or the feed vehicle 
because they visit several herds on the same day (Ribbens et al., 2009; Nöremark et al., 
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2013). However, in this thesis, the estimated risk attributed to these vehicles was low, 
mainly due to the low probability of transmission of BVDV and BoHV-1 through 
cadavers. On the other hand, the feed vehicles that entered to the corridors where animals 
have their feed was described in few farms (49/127). Furthermore, the potential of 
transmission by these vehicles could be affected for many external factors such as the 
virus survival on different surfaces of the vehicle (e.g., tires), persistence of the virus in 
the ground and the ability to infect an animal from this type of substrate.  
The impact of the application of the most common biosecurity measures for the studied 
viruses was also evaluated. For the model of animal movements, the impact of main 
biosecurity measures was evaluated in a single farm, therefore it cannot be generalized. 
However, the results were in accordance with what is widely recommended for the entry 
of new animals into the herd, ranking in the first place the correct use of quarantine, in 
terms of facilities, duration and management within the daily work routine (Villarroel et 
al., 2007; Maunsell and Donovan, 2008). Taking into account the heterogeneity of 
movements in the analyzed farms, it would be interesting to evaluate those biosecurity 
measures in all farms studied as was done in the indirect contacts model. In addition, it 
should be included in the analysis other common practices such as reducing the number 
of animals purchased and the number of herds from which the animals can be purchased 
(Kristensen and Jakobsen, 2011; Mee et al., 2012), or evaluate the effect of combining 
different measures. For example, for visitors the use of boots and clothing exclusive of 
the farm greatly reduced the probability of BVDV and BoHV-1 introduction, which could 
also be considered in fulfill quarantine for animals entering. On the other hand, the 
measure with the greatest impact was not identified, because in the current study we did 
not establish whether its impact was greater than or equal to the other evaluated measures. 
Therefore, further analysis by using these models should be performed in order to 
evaluate the measure that have the greatest impact in each farm, and the measures that 
would be more worthwhile based on their cost.  
In the development of the models we had the support of field veterinarians to identify the 
main pathways to BVDV and BoHV-1 introduction in dairy farms and to clarify some 
field practices about which we had no information, such as the transportation of animals 
in the study areas or the number of daily visits made by a veterinarian. This highlights the 
absence of systematized records of routine dairy farm activities, such as the entry of 
vehicles, people, etc., and for transport companies, veterinarians, hoof trimmers or 
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visitors in general, recording daily routes. Previous studies identified the value of 
recording and sharing information to improve the risk classification of animals that enter 
in cattle farms (Hobbs, 2004; Damiaans, et al., 2019). Moreover, this information would 
be especially useful for estimating input parameters with greater precision, facilitating the 
development of more robust epidemiological models on transmission, spread and 
prediction of infectious diseases outbreaks.  
On the other hand, digitalization of this information could provide accurate data on 
disease risks for all stakeholders in animal health. For example, for improving cattle 
trading decisions based on the disease risk of animals that will be purchased by farmers 
or risk-based trading markets for cattle, in which disease-free livestock bring an 
economical compensation to the farmer. Building confidence for consumers generate 
greater social responsibility in livestock traders, livestock keepers and decision makers 
(Enticott, 2016).  
Currently, livestock systems have access to technologies to generate more precise 
information, such as system detecting automatic estrus in dairy cows (Rutten et al., 2014) 
or the automatic body weight scoring system to estimate body weight in dairy cattle 
(Bewley et al., 2010) or detect earlier stages of diseases. These technologies in primary 
production should be understand as components that influence food supply chain through 
traceability and generate evidence of safety that could increase the trust of consumers 
(Rojo-Gimeno et al., 2019). In these types of cooperative systems, social or community 
trust is one component in building a successful system for disease prevention like 
biosecurity programs based on effective communication between stakeholders (Frössling 
and Nöremark, 2016). For these reasons, we believe that the usefulness of tools such as 
those generated in this thesis promote the use of accurate information that can be captured, 
analyzed, and used for decision making in the manner proposed for the use of the Big 
Data in farming operations (Wolfert et al., 2017). 
In addition, farmer education and updating veterinarians in biosecurity topics and 
infectious diseases could improve acceptance and enforcement of biosecurity practices at 
the farm level. A lack of understanding of how infectious diseases can spread and in what 
way the biosecurity measures are supposed to break the different routes of transmission 
are necessary to raise awareness of the implementation of biosecurity measures. 
Veterinarians should help famers to better understand the routes of transmission for 
diseases that are most threatening to their operations. To develop optimal plans aimed at 
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preventing disease transmission, they should ensure that farmers understand reasons 
behind their advice and giving farmers the opportunity to express their viewpoints, 
contributing to build teamwork between the farmer and the veterinarian to structure a 
reasonable protocol focusing on prevention under daily field practice conditions (Brennan 
and Christley 2012; Laanen et al. 2014; Ritter et al., 2018). Furthermore, education, 
training, and the involvement of all stakeholders are essential for the success of 
biosecurity at the enterprise, regional, and national levels, so, hence particular improved 
knowledge transfer so that all stakeholders can identify their own role and improve farm-
level biosecurity (Robertson, 2020).  
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1. The annual median probability of BVDV and BoHV-1 introduction through 
animal movements (in farms that entered animals) was very heterogeneous for 
both diseases. For some farms, the probability was close to 0% whereas for others 
was 99%. Nevertheless, in 75% of the studied farms such probability was below 
28% and 23% for BVDV and BoHV-1, respectively. 
 
2. Shared transport with cattle from other farms had the highest probability of BVDV 
and BoHV-1 introduction. Therefore, animal transport practices should be 
improved to reduce such risk. 
 
3. The annual probability of introducing BVDV or BoHV-1 through indirect 
contacts ranged between 0.5% and 15% and from 1% to 25% respectively, in the 
127 farms that were evaluated. 
 
4. Among indirect contacts, allowing drivers from calf vehicles to contact with cattle 
present at the farm and visits of veterinarians had the highest probability of BVDV 
and BoHV-1 introduction. Therefore, biosecurity measures against these routes 
should be improved. 
 
5. A correct quarantine (i.e., testing cattle on arrival, duration period of at least 24 
days and quarantine visited at the end of the workday) and providing boots and 
protective clothing to visitors greatly reduced the probability of infection by direct 
and indirect contacts, respectively. Therefore, their implementation in dairy farms 
should be encouraged. 
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Annex A – Supplemetary Information Study I 
DEVELOPMENT OF A QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT OF BOVINE VIRAL DIARRHEA 
VIRUS AND BOVINE HERPESVIRUS-1 INTRODUCTION IN DAIRY CATTLE HERDS TO IMPROVE 
BIOSECURITY 
B. Benavides, J. Casal, J.F. Diéguez, E. Yus, S.J. Moya, R. Armengol, and A. Allepuz 
 
Background Years of expertise Number of dairy farms advised 
Animal health, reproduction, and bovine clinic 40 25 
Animal health, reproduction, and technical management 15 22 
Animal health and reproduction  4 15 
Animal health and reproduction  28 26 
Animal health, reproduction, and milk quality 20 20 
Table A1. Characterization of field veterinarians which participated in the discussion groups 
 
 Equation      Description  
Probability of purchasing an infected animal  
1. Number of animals purchased each time from country/area “i” and age group “k” 
 
𝑛 (𝑖, 𝑘) =
animals (i, k)/ times (i) 
farms (i)
 
 
• animals (i, k): number of animals 
purchased throughout the year from 
country/area “i” of group age “k” per 
farm.  
• times (i): number of times animals have 
been purchased from country/area “i” in 
one year. 
 
 
 
• farms (i): number of farms from which 
animals can be purchased in each 
country/area “i”. 
 
2. Probability that at least one animal from a batch coming from a single farm of a certain 
country/area “i” was already infected with BVDV or BoHV-1“j” (being “j” a subscript 
indicating if the animal was a PI, TI, TR or BoHV-1 seropositive animal). 
 
𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑓 (𝑖, 𝑗) = 1 − (1 − 𝐻𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑣 (𝑖) ∗  〖𝑊𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑣)〗^(𝑛(𝑖, 𝑘) ∗ 𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑡(𝑖) ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• HerdPrev (i): herd prevalence in 
country/area “i”.  
• WithinPrev: the proportion of 
seropositive (BoHV-1) and viremic 
(BVDV) animals 
• gest (i): proportion of pregnant animals 
imported from country/area “i” (this 
parameter was only used for BVDV 
calculations, and in the case of animals 
greater than 12 months).  
3.1 Probability that a single animal was infected  
 
𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑓_𝐴𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙 (𝑖, 𝑗)   =  1 − (1 − 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑓 (𝑖, 𝑗) ) 
1
𝑛
(𝑖,𝑘)∗𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑡(𝑖)
 
 
 
 
3.2 Expected number of BVDV and BoHV-1 animals already infected in the farm of origin  
 
𝐴𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑠_𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 (𝑖, 𝑗)  = 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑓_𝐴𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙 (𝑖, 𝑗)  ∗  𝑛(𝑖, 𝑘) ∗ 𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑡(𝑖)  
 
Probability of false negatives    
 
 
4. Probability that one infected animal yielded a false negative result  
 
𝑃_𝑓𝑎𝑙_𝑛𝑒𝑔(𝑖, 𝑗) =
𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑓_𝐴𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙 (𝑖, 𝑗) ∗ (1 − 𝑆𝑒) 
((1 − 𝑆𝑒) ∗ 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑓_𝐴𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙 (𝑖, 𝑗) + (𝑆𝑝 ∗ (1 − 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑓_𝐴𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙 (𝑖, 𝑗))
 
• Pinf_Animal: Probability that a single 
animal was infected  
• Se: sensitivity 
• Sp: specificity  
 
 
 
5.1 Probability that at least one infected animal was present in the batch of animals  
 
𝑃_𝑓𝑎𝑙_𝑛𝑒𝑔_𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ (𝑖, 𝑗) = 1 − (1 −〖 𝑃_𝑓𝑎𝑙_𝑛𝑒𝑔 (𝑖, 𝑗)  )〗^(𝐴𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑠_𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 (𝑖, 𝑗))) 
 
• P_fal_neg: Probability that one 
infected animal yielded a false 
negative result 
• Animals_Infected: Expected number of 
BVDV and BoHV-1 animals already 
infected in the farm of origin   
5.2 Probability that at least one infected animal was purchased from at least one of the farms from 
which animals could be introduced 
𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑓_𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ (𝑖, 𝑗) = 1 − (1 −  𝑃_𝑓𝑎𝑙_𝑛𝑒𝑔_𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ  (𝑖, 𝑗) )𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑠 (𝑖)) 
 
• P_fal_neg_batch: Probability that at 
least one infected animal was present 
in the batch of animals 
 
Probability of infection during transport  
6.1 Probability of sharing a transport vehicle with at least one PI or AI animal in country/area “i”  
 
𝑃_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒  (𝑖)  =〖𝐻𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑣 (𝑖) ∗ (1 − (1 −  𝑊𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑣(𝑖) ∗ 𝑃_𝐴𝐼 𝑜𝑟 𝑃_𝑃𝐼)〗^𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑑 
 
• P_AI: probability of an active infection 
in a group of BoHV-1 seropositive 
animals 
• P_PI: probability of PI animal  
• Loaded: number of animals loaded by 
farm 
 
6.2 Probability of sharing a transport vehicle with a PI or AI animal when purchasing animals from 
country/area “i”  
𝑃_𝐼_𝑉 (𝑖) = 1 − (1 − 𝑃_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒(𝑖))^𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑑   
• P_share: Probability of sharing a 
transport vehicle with at least one PI or 
AI animal in country/area “i” 
• Visited: number of farms visited by 
country/area 
7. Probability that at least one non-infected purchased animal of the age group “k” yielded an 
infection status “j” due to sharing transport vehicle with a PI or AI animal from each country/area 
“i”  
𝑃𝐵𝑉𝐷𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑(𝑖, 𝑗) = 1 − (1 −〖 𝑃_𝐼_𝑉 (𝑖)) 〗^(ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑦(𝑖, 𝑘) ∗ 𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑡(𝑖) ) 
 
• P_I_V: Probability of sharing a 
transport vehicle with a PI or AI 
animal when purchasing animals from 
country/area “i” 
• Healthy: non infected purchased 
animal 
• gest (i): proportion of pregnant 
animals imported  
 
 
 
𝑃_𝐼𝐵𝑅_𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑  (𝑖) = 1 − (1 −  𝑃_𝐼_𝑉(𝑖)) ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑦(𝑖) 
 
Probability of infection due to being transported in a contaminated vehicle  
8. Probability that at least one non-infected animal was infected due to being transported in a 
vehicle coming from country ‘i’ and develop an infectious status ‘j’  
 
𝑃_𝐼_𝐶 (𝑖, 𝑗) = 1 − (𝑃_𝐼_𝑉(𝑖) ∗ 𝐶(𝑖)  ∗ (1 − 𝐸) ∗ 𝑆 ∗ 𝑃𝑇 +  𝑃_𝐼_𝑉(𝑖) ∗ (1 − 𝐶(𝑖)) ∗ 𝑆 ∗ 𝑃𝑇) ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑦(𝑖,𝑘) 
 
• P_I_V: Probability of sharing a 
transport vehicle with a PI or AI 
animal when purchasing animals from 
country/area “i” 
• C: probability of cleaning and 
disinfecting the vehicle between 
transports in country/area “i”.  
• E: efficacy of the cleaning and 
disinfection 
• S: survival of BVDV in metal 
• PT: probability of infection of a 
susceptible animal in a contaminated 
surface.  
Annual probability of infection by BVDV or BoHV-1 due to purchasing animals  
9.  
 
𝑃_𝐵𝑉𝐷_𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒 = 1 − ∏
5
𝑖=1
(1 − 𝑃𝐼_𝑌(𝑖)) ∗ ∏
5
𝑖=1
(1 − 𝑇𝐼_𝑌(𝑖)) ∗ ∏
5
𝑖=1
(1 − 𝑇𝑅_𝑌 (𝑖)) 
 
𝑃_𝐼𝐵𝑅_𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒 = 1 − ∏
5
𝑖=1
(1 − 𝐼𝐵𝑅_𝑃𝑜𝑠_𝑌(𝑖)) 
• PI_Y: annual probability of purchasing 
at least one PI 
• TI_Y: annual probability of purchasing 
at least one TI 
• TR_Y: annual probability of 
purchasing at least one TR 
• IBR_Pos_Y: annual probability of 
purchasing at least one TR 
 
Table A2: Equations used to estimate probabilities inside the model to evaluate the probability of BVDV and BoHV-1 introduction in a dairy farm
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Fomite Treatment 
Survival time (Hours) 
1 2 4 12 24 
Rubber Mucus  88.6% 75% 53.6% 10.4% 5.6% 
Galvanized metal  Mucus  21.5% 9.6% 3.9% 0.4% 0.2% 
Soil Mucus  47.9% 26.2% 12.0% 1.4% 0.7% 
Table A3: Probability of Bovine Viral Diarrhea Virus survival after application to the potential fomite *Treatment: Prior 
to application to the potential fomite, the virus was diluted in PBS that included 20% synthetic mucus. Source: Stevens 
et al., 2011. 
 
 
Figure A1: Pathway of entrance according types reared replacement heifers offsite. Shared/Not shared: when place to 
reared heifers is shared or not with animals of other farms; PI: Persistently infected with Bovine Viral Diarrhea Virus; 
AI: Acutely infected with Bovine Herpesvirus-1; Q: Quarantine; T: Test on quarantine; R: Quarantine routines; FN: False 
negative. 
 
 
 
 
Figure A2: Pathway of entrance according to the scenarios considered for the movements to cattle competitions; AI: 
Acutely infected with Bovine Herpesvirus-1; Q: Quarantine; T: Test on quarantine; R: Quarantine routines; FN: False 
negative.
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Annex B – Supplemetary Information 
Study II 
QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT OF BVDV AND BoHV-1 
INTRODUCTION THROUGH INDIRECT CONTACTS BASED ON 
IMPLEMENTED BIOSECURITY MEASURES IN DAIRY FARMS OF 
SPAIN 
B. Benavides, J. Casal, J.F. Diéguez, E. Yus, S.J. Moya, R. Armengol, and A. Allepuz 
 
Veterinarian profile Years of expertise Number of dairy farms 
advised 
Animal health, reproduction, and bovine clinic 40 25 
Nutrition and economic advice 5 25 
Animal health, reproduction, and milk quality 20 20 
Animal health  35 125 
Animal health  13 90 
Farm health management 15 1 
Bovine clinic 19 NC* 
Nutrition, bovine clinic, and livestock 
association manager 
33 1750** 
Bovine clinic  9 50 
Animal health and production laboratory 27 NA*** 
Table A1. Characterization of field veterinarians who participated in discussion groups. *NC: Non countable; ** 
Number of members of livestock association; ***NA: Not apply. 
